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Juvenile Delinquency and
Crime: Achievements of the
1959 Minnesota Legislature
Professor Pirsig analyzes significant criminal and delin-
quency legislation enacted in Minnesota in 1959. First, he
describes the act reorganizing the state agencies concerned
with delinquent youths and criminals following the adjudi-
cation of delinquency or conviction of a crime. He also con-
siders the legislation extending required probation service
to all counties in the state. Finally, he devotes the major
portion of the Article to discussion of some procedural
problems that commonly arise in a delinquency proceeding
and analysis of the solutions provided in the revised juvenile
court code. Although his discussion focuses on the Minne-
sota statutes, it will undoubtedly have value for other states
which are contemplating the enactment of, or have already
enacted, similar legislation.
Maynard E. Pirsig*
The 1959 session of the Minnesota legislature was marked by the
enactment of significant legislation in the field of criminal correction
and juvenile delinquency. Probably in no other session since the turn
of the century has the legislature accomplished so much in these
areas; and, with the possible exception of California, no other state
within recent years has duplicated the record of progress incorpor-
ated in the 1959 Minnesota legislation in the criminal law field. The
juvenile court act of 1917 and the youth conservation act of 1947
were, of course, milestones which, no doubt, paved the way for the
present legislation. But, in 1959, not one but three important acts
were adopted. These are the creation of the corrections department,
the extension of compulsory probation service to all juvenile courts
of the state, and the revision of the juvenile court code.' This legis-
lation places the state in the forefront in the respective areas with
which it deals. Some of the provisions of each of these acts will be
discussed in the following pages.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The suggestions and criti-
cisms of Professor John R. Ellingston of the University of Minnesota Law School
received during the preparation of this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Several other important acts were also passed in the criminal law field, but they
were of more limited scope and will not be considered in this Article.
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I. DEiqRT OF COmECTONS
There has now been established in this state a department of
corrections which includes all the activities and facilities on the state
level which relate to correctional and treatment programs for adult
criminals and juvenile delinquents.2 An earlier major step in the
direction of better organization had been taken in 1947 when the
youth conservation commission was created,3 and in 1949, when
administration of the state training school for boys at Red Wing and
the home school for girls at Sak Centre was transferred from the
department headed by the director of public institutions to the
youth conservation commission.'
This youth conservation commission program has two aspects.
One deals with youths adjudged delinquent by the juvenile courts
of the state. The judge cannot commit the youth to a state institu-
tion but must commit him to the youth conservation commission.
From that point on, the commission has complete power to deter-
mine what disposition should be made of the case to bring about the
most effective rehabilitation and to carry out that disposition. The
commission may place the youth on probation under the guidance
of its own probation agents, or it may, instead, commit him or her to
the above mentioned institutions. It decides when and under what
conditions he shall be paroled and upon parole he is placed under
the supervision of one of its own agents. Subject to the limitation
that he cannot be held beyond the age of twenty-one, it determines
when he shall be discharged.
The other aspect relates to youths under the age of twenty-one
who are convicted of a felony by the district courts. Again, the court
must commit the youth to the commission, if he is not dealt with
locally; and again the commission has complete power of disposition
and execution with the exception that, up to the present, the insti-
tutions to which the youth might be committed have not been under
the control of the commission. For example, until the department of
corrections act, the state reformatory for men had been under the
commissioner of public welfare.
The purpose of these measures has been to provide an integrated
program of treatment which avoids the conflict and lack of coordina-
tion which naturally arises when responsibility is divided among
several agencies.
On the adult level, no similar type of integrated program or
organization has heretofore existed. Commitment by a court which
2. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263.
3. Minn. Laws 1947, ch. 595. See Pirsig, Procedural Aspects of the Youth Conser-
vation Act, 32 MwN. L. REv. 471 (1948).
4. Minn. Laws 1949, ch. 561. The subsequent development of the youth conserva-
tion program through camps and other facilities is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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has found a defendant guilty of a felony has been to the appropriate
penal institution. These institutions have been under the commis-
sioner of public welfare. Release from these institutions before
expiration of the maximum term fixed by the court has been the
responsibility of the state parole board. The board has been ap-
pointed by the governor for fixed terms and has been independent
of any other state department or division. The board also has main-
tained a staff of parole agents which supervised those placed by it
on parole and, to some extent, those placed on probation by district
courts.
When reorganization of the state government was proposed by
the present administration, it became necessary to consider very
concretely what type of organization should extend to the correc-
tional field. Surprisingly, there was very little disagreement among
those interested in this field as to the need for reorganization. But
conflicting views developed as to the form the reorganization should
take. Some students of the subject felt that both the adult program
and the youth conservation program logically and properly belonged
under the commissioner of public welfare. But objection to this sug-
gestion developed, based in considerable part on the feeling that
proper administration in the area of correction is of such importance
that it should have the direct attention of the governor and the line
of responsibility should be directly to him. Fears were expressed
that the prospect of an effective administration would be less favor-
able if the several correctional agencies and facilities concerned
constituted but a division in a large department also concerned with
other important responsibilities. The latter view prevailed.
Another suggestion took the following form. The functions of the
state parole board and those of the youth conservation commission
were analyzed as falling into two separate and distinct categories.
On the one hand, they performed what were deemed to be quasi-
judicial functions, which included such duties as determining when
and on what terms a prisoner should be put on parole, when parole
should be revoked, and when a discharge should be granted. In the
case of the youth conservation commission, these included such
additional powers as placing a youth on probation or committing
him to an institution. In another category were such activities as
supervising probationers and parolees and the operation of the insti-
tutions, camps, and other facilities. These were considered to be
administrative functions and should not be intermixed with the
quasi-judicial functions in the same board or commission. The pro-
posed lines of organization would be based on these separate func-
tions. The parole board and the youth conservation commission
5. See Report of Committee on the Youth Conservation Act, 14 Bench & Bar of
Minn., June 1957, p. 40.
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would be limited to the quasi-judicial functions and the new ad-
ministrator to be established would be assigned the administrative
duties. To this suggestion was added the further one that the qualifi-
cations and work of a probation or parole agent supervising adults
were not essentially different from those of a similar agent super-
vising youths and that, therefore, the same agents could be used for
supervising both, thus adding to the efficiency of the operation.
However, these suggestions also met with disagreement, particu-
larly from those who had supported the youth conservation program.
Two principal objections were raised. One was that the youth con-
servation program had shown that there were advantages in an
integrated program of treatment in which both the so-called quasi-
judicial and the administrative functions had been combined in a
single agency. It was thought that these advantages would be lost in
an organization in which these functions were separated. The other
objection raised was that the treatment of youthful offenders could
most effectively be carried out if personnel were selected for their
special qualifications in dealing with youths. These considerations, it
was thought, called for a vertical type of organization of the depart-
ment in which decision-making, personnel, and facilities as they
relate to youths would be administratively separated from those
relating to adult criminals.
The latter view ultimately prevailed. The committee of the Minne-
sota State Bar Association which had considered the subject for a
number of years and participated in these preliminary discussions,
reported as follows:
As part of its original reorganization plan the state administraton had first
considered transferring the Youth Conservation Commission and the State
Board of Parole to the Department of Welfare, where they would have
been administered along wth the adult prisons and reformatories. After
consultation with members of this committee, the Administration proposed
the creation of a new Department of Corrections which would include a
Youth Conservation Division and an Adult Corrections Division.
Establishment of a Department of Corrections offers a means of bringing
together into a single streamlined agency, diagnostic, institutional and
parole services for adult offenders as the Youth Conservation Commission
has done for juvenile and youth offenders. The present administrative
separation of institutions and parole services hampers treatment aimed at
rehabilitation of adult offenders. The proposal would make possible
through the commissioner, the leadership that the adult corrections field
urgently needs; to accomplish many desirable objectives, such as for
instance, forestry camps that can combine the rescue of men with conser-
vation of natural resources, at a cash saving to the State. A Department of
Corrections could provide the Youth Conservation Commission and the
Adult Division with many common housekeeping services, such as purchas-
ing and accounting on a more modem and efficient basis than would be
possible for smaller separate agencies.
The danger, however, of coabining correctional services to children and
[Vol. 44:363
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adults in one department is twofold: First, it can obliterate the distinction,
that has taken half a century to achieve, between children and criminal
adults. No gains of administrative efficiency would justify reattaching the
stigma of "convict" to children. A second and related danger lies in the
possible breakdown of the integration of diagnosis, institutional care, and
parole which have become recognized as successive steps in one continuous
process of rehabilitation, and which must therefore be under the control
of the same administrative authority. This integration of the treatment
process is a major strength of the Youth Conservation Commission. To
break it down by placing all institutions, juvenile and adult, in one division,
and all parole services, juvenile and adult, in another, would undo much
of what Minnesota has gained over the last ten years in the handling of
children and youthful offenders and would forestall any significant gains
in the adult field.
After much study, this committee concluded that these pitfalls can be
avoided through the establishment by law of two divisions in a Depart-
ment of Corrections; a Division of Youth Conservation in which the
essential structure and functions of the Youth Conservation Commission
are retained intact, and a Division of Adult Corrections which will include
adult probation, institutional care, and parole services organized along the
same lines as the Youth Conservation Commission.
After a number of meetings, members of this committee and the admin-
istration agreed upon a proposed Department of Corrections that would
have accomplished these goals. 6
The advocates of a department of corrections were thus able to
present a common front in urging the passage of the bill submitted
and ultimately enacted. However, the revised bill which emerged as
incorporating the common understanding contains evidences of its
turbulent birth, and its provisions are consequently not always mod-
els of clarity. Since some amendment of these provisions may later
be undertaken, the act will here be examined in some detail. In or-
der that this examination may be kept in proper perspective and not
detract from the very great achievement which the act represents, it
should be said that the act proceeds on two basic and enlightened
premises. One is that there shall be a single head of a single depart-
ment which includes the whole of the correctional field on the state
level including both adult crime and juvenile delinquency.7 To him
and those responsible to him, the state is entitled to look for the
proper administration of the state's services in this field. For the first
time in the history of this state, an organizational structure has been
established which permits the initiation and development of pro-
grams and facilities in the most efficient and effective manner. The
other premise is that the department will be organized into two gen-
eral divisions, one dealing with adult criminals, the other with
6. Id. at 40-42.
7. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 1(1), providing: "The department of corrections is
hereby created under the control and supervision of the commissioner of corrections
which office is hereby established."
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youths in accordance with the youth conservation act. Implicit in
this organizational structure is the intent that each of the divisions
will develop an integrated program of treatment applicable to its
respective area. Since an integrated program already exists in large
measure under the youth conservation act, one may expect that, at
least initially, the greater impact of the establishment of the divi-
sions will be in the adult field, and that the same striking results will
there ensue that occurred with the development of the youth conser-
vation program.
One may expect also, in the longer view, that there will be a more
critical examination of our correctional programs and practices in
both fields and a greater readiness to undertake new measures de-
signed for more effective rehabilitation and reduced cost to the state.
A. Youth Conservation Division
Examining in detail, first, the provisions relating to the youth con-
servation commission, the new act provides:
The commissioner of corrections shall establish a division of youth conser-
vation under the control and supervision of a deputy commissioner of
corrections who shall be appointed by the commissioner, and who shall
serve at the pleasure of the commissioner in the unclassified service of the
state.8
The division of youth conservation is not to be confused with the
former youth conservation commission. The commission is not ex-
plicitly created or preserved, but it is implicit that it will continue to
function within the division of youth conservation. Section 10 of
the act provides: "The youth conservation commission shall con-
tinue to exercise all powers and duties vested in or imposed upon
such commission as heretofore constituted."9
The commission is further dealt with by section 11, amending sec-
tion 242.03 of the Minnesota Statutes, 1957, which is part of the
youth conservation act. Section 242.03, as thus amended, reads:
The commission shall consist of five persons, including the commissioner
of public welfare, a deputy commissioner of corrections in control of and
supervising the division of youth conservation, and three others, at least
one of whom shall be a woman appointed by the governor, with the
consent of the senate .... The deputy commissioner of corrections shall
be the chairman and director of the commission. The director as deputy
commissioner of corrections in control of and supervising the division of
youth conservation shall be responsible for the administration and enforce-
ment of sections 242.01 to 242.54 with policy matters and decisions
pertaining to the care, treatment, and disposition of persons committed
to it determined by the commission. 10
8. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 1(2).
9. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 10.
10. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 11.
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These several provisions would appear to make some substantial
changes in the status of the youth conservation commission and its
internal relationships. The director, who is now designated as a dep-
uty commissioner of corrections, has become the appointee of the
commissioner of corrections rather than of the governor. He no long-
er serves for a fixed term but at the pleasure of the commissioner of
corrections. He is "in control of and supervising the division of youth
conservation" and his primary responsibility for the administration
and enforcement of the youth conservation act is to the commission-
er of corrections rather than to the commission.
The youth conservation commission's duties are to be confined to
"policy matters and decisions pertaining to the care, treatment, and
disposition of persons committed to it." It may be doubted whether
such a sharp line can be drawn between policy matters and deci-
sions, on the one hand, and administration, on the other. The admin-
istration of the care, treatment, and disposition of youths must be
made pursuant to innumerable decisions of policy which should not
fall within the responsibilities of the commission. Decisions of policy
underlie the determination of the degree of discipline to be adminis-
tered and the kind of conduct for which it is imposed, the extent and
type of individual counseling to be provided, the curriculum of the
school, the type of work activities provided, the recreation made
available, and other similar questions. The act hardly intended to
entrust these matters to the commission, for in common understand-
ing they rather clearly relate to the administration of an institution.
In all probability, no more was intended by the provision than that
the commission is to determine such questions as whether a youth
committed to it shall be placed in an institution or camp or placed
on probation, and whether and when a youth should be placed on
parole. It may include also, though this is subject to greater uncer-
tainly, determination of the rules of conduct to be observed while
on parole.
Even when the "policy" powers of the commission are so defined,
it would seem evident that there must be a close working relation-
ship between the department of corrections and its division of
youth conservation, on the one hand, and the youth conservation
commission, on the other; otherwise the best of programs developed
by the department and the division can be frustrated. An important
fact giving assurance of the necessary cooperation lies in the fact
that the deputy commissioner appointed by the commissioner is the
full-time member and chairman of the commission.1 His expertise
and that of his staff will ordinarily result in their recommendations
receiving the approval of the other members of the commission. The
11. The other three members serve part time and are appointed by the governor
for six year terms. MIN. STAT. §§ 242.03-.04 (1957).
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latter's contribution lies in the point of view, the suggestions, and on
occasion, if need be, the veto-decision of the outsider not enmeshed
in the details of administration.
Many administrative matters relate only indirectly to the care,
treatment, or disposition of youths, such as the employment of
personnel, statistical analyses, accounting and budgetary matters,
clerical assistance, record keeping, which need not concern the com-
mission and which can more effectively be administered by the
department or division. It is evidently with this thought in mind
that the act provides as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this act and to other applicable laws, the
commissioner of corrections shall provide the youth conservation commis-
sion with all personnel, supplies, equipment, and other administrative
services as may be required to enable the youth conservation commission
to perform the duties and obligations imposed by law.12
One further section pertaining to the youth conservation commis-
sion should be noted. Section 12 of the act amends section 242.46 of
the Minnesota- Statutes, so that the commissioner of corrections
rather than the youth conservation commission appoints the parole
agents. It provides:
The commissioner of corrections may appoint agents, who, under regula-
tions prescribed by the youth conservation commission, shall investigate
the homes of inmates previous to their parole and have supervision over
those out on parole and those apprenticed, and who shall perform such
other duties as the commissioner of corrections may require.
It is not clear whether these provisions intend only the appoint-
ment of the agents by the commissioner or include also their super-
vision under regulations prescribed by the commission. "Regulations
prescribed by the youth conservation commission" probably does not
mean regulations of general application, for this would seem proper-
ly a matter of administration not intended to be conferred upon the
commission. The phrase probably refers to the conditions laid down
by the commission in granting parole. In either event, the powers of
appointment and supervision are subject to delegation by the
commissioner.13
The change in power of appointment from the youth conservation
commission to the commissioner of corrections is confined in the
section to parole agents. Equally important, but probably over-
looked, would seem to be the personnel and heads of the state train-
ing school for boys, the similar home for girls, the new reception and
diagnostic center approved in 1957, and the forestry camps. The
statutes giving the power of appointment to the youth conservation
12. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 10.
13. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, §§ 1(2),(3).
[Vol. 44:863
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commission in these instances were not changed. Thus the commis-
sion has "the general management" of the school for boys,14 "the
financial control and general supervision of the school for girls to-
gether "with power and authority to appoint a superintendent and
such other officers and employees as it may deem necessary and
proper for the due administration of the affairs of the school .... ;
"the general control and management of the reception and diagnos-
tic center . . .";16 and the power to "establish and operate conser-
vation camps." 17
B. Adult Corrections Division
With respect to the organization of the division of adult correc-
tions, the drafters of the act had, of course, to deal with a different
situation. There was no already existing integrated program corre-
sponding to that of the youth conservation commission. The several
penal institutions for adults were under the commissioner of public
welfare, while parole and probation were the responsibility of the
parole board, an independent agency.
Both of these agencies are, of course, within the new department
of corrections. As already noted,'8 the commissioner of corrections is
the head of the entire department. He is to "establish a division of
adult corrections which shall include probation, parole, and institu-
tions, under the control and supervision of a deputy commissioner of
corrections who shall be appointed by the commissioner.
14. Mni. STAT. § 242.41 (1957).
15. Mn. STAT. § 242.53 (1957).
16. MwN. STAT. § 242.385 (1957).
17. MwNN. STAT. § 242.37 (1957).
MwN. STAT. § 242.375 (1957) implicitly recognizes the power of the commission
to "assign an employee of the commission as a superintendent of any institution or
camp."
The provision of § 10 of the department of corrections act that -the commissioner
of corrections shall provide the youth conservation commission with "all personnel
... and other administrative services as may be required" might be said to include
the personnel of the several institutions mentioned. But the same point could be
made concerning its applicability to parole agents, and yet § 12 was apparently
thought to be necessary.
The point might also be made that by § 11 of the new act the deputy commissioner
of corrections has been given the responsibility "for the administration and enforce-
ment of sections 242.01 to 242.54," and that this includes the powers of appoint-
ment covered by the mentioned sections.
Eight days after the department of corrections act was enacted, § 242.46 of the
Minnesota Statutes was again amended but without effecting a change in the power
of appointment, which remained in the youth conservation commission. Minn. Laws
1959, ch. 698, § 2. This act, however, was concerned with providing probation
facilities to the counties of the state, rather than with reorganization. Hence, it is
believed that § 12 of the department of corrections act, quoted in the text, continues
to remain in force.
18. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
19. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 1(2).
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Under these provisions, the commissioner of corrections, in estab-
lishing the division, may do two things: (1) place probation, parole,
and institutions in the division, and (2) put the division under the
control and supervision of his deputy. To effectuate the reorganiza-
tion, section 2, subdivision 1, provides for the transfer of the
institutions to the department:
All the powers and duties now vested in or imposed upon the commis-
sioner of public welfare relating to the administration, management, and
operation of the state prison, the state reformatory for men, and the state
reformatory for women are hereby transferred to and vested in, and
imposed upon the commissioner of corrections. All the powers and duties
now vested in the commissioner of public welfare in relation to such
institutions are hereby abolished.2
0
This provision suggests that the commissioner may have supervision
over institutions directly, but as noted, it is to be construed in light
of the above mentioned provision that institutions may be placed by
him in the division of adult corrections, in which case the deputy
commissioner of adult corrections would deal with them.
20. Section 2(2) of the act also provides:
All the powers and duties now vested in, or imposed upon the commissioner
of public welfare relating to prisons, jails and loakcups, as contained in Minne-
sota Statutes 1957, Sections 256.02, 641.21, 641.22, 641.25, 641.26, 642.01,
642.02, 642.09, 642.10, and 642.11 are hereby transferred to, vested in, and
imposed upon the commissioner of corrections. All the powers and duties now
vested in the commissioner of public welfare in relation to such prisons, jails
or lockups, are hereby abolished.
The phrase "administration, management, and operation" of the several men-
tioned institutions must be construed broadly to include duties formerly imposed on
the commissioner of public welfare with respect to prisoners, and the like, even
though they do not literally involve the "administration, management, and opera-
tion" of an institution. For example, the following sections would appear to be
included:
§ 637.04, which requires the state parole board to provide the commissioner of
public welfare with reports on its activities taken with respect to prisoners in the
institutions.
§ 637.07, which requires the commissioner of public welfare to inform the state
parole board as to the conduct of prisoners prior to their appearance before the
board.
§ 637.10, which requires parole agents of the parole board to make certain
investigations as to dependents of prisoners when so required by the commissioner
of public welfare.
§ 637.15, which requires the commissioner of public welfare to transfer a pregnant
female prisoner to a hospital.
§ 640.09, which permits the commissioner of public welfare to visit prisoners
without the permission of the warden. The original purpose for this provision no
longer applies, but retention of it should cause no harm.
§ 640.19, which permits the warden, with the consent of the commissioner of
public welfare, to offer a reward of more than $25, but less than $100, for the
apprehension and return of an escaped prisoner.
§ 640.24, which deals with the sale by the commissioner of public welfare of
binder twine manufactured at the state prison.
§ 640.44, which deals with the use of prisoners in conservation work.
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Under section 3, subdivision 1, the former parole board has be-
come the adult corrections commission headed by a deputy com-
missioner of corrections:
The name of the board of parole and probation is hereby changed to
the adult corrections commission. The duties of chairman of the adult
corrections commission are hereby imposed upon the deputy comissioner
of corrections controlling and supervising the division of adult corrections,
in the department of corrections. Subject to the other provisions of this act
and to other applicable law, the adult corrections commission shall con-
tinue to exercise all powers and duties vested in or imposed upon the state
board of parole and probation as heretofore constituted but in the depart-
ment of corrections.
21
This provision introduces some important changes with respect to
the parole board, now called the adult corrections commission. The
chairman is appointed by the commissioner of corrections rather
than by the governor, and he serves at the pleasure of the commis-
sioner rather than for a specified term. He thus appears to be pri-
marily responsible to the commissioner rather than to the board and
the governor. This follows closely the corresponding relationship
established by the act with respect to the chairman of the youth
conservation commission.2"
The last sentence of section 3, subdivision 1, quoted above, would
appear to leave the powers of the parole board, or the adult correc-
tions commission as it is now called, basically as they were prior to
the new act. But the fact that this sentence is "subject to the other
provisions of this act" may necessitate some qualifications to this
conclusion.
No doubt is left as to the retention by the commission of the power
to parole and discharge prisoners from the several institutions. The
same is true of the power to make rules governing the granting of
paroles and discharges, the fixing of the terms and conditions of
parole, and the like. In amending the statutes which formerly gave
these powers to the parole board, the term "adult corrections com-
mission" was substituted for the "parole board."23
But in amending the section dealing with the supervising of parole
agents,24 the term "commissioner of corrections" was substituted for
the "parole board," so that it now reads:
The commissioner of corrections, as far as possible, shall exercise super-
21. Section 3(2) of the act requires the commissioner of corrections, "subject to
the provisions of this act, and other applicable laws," to provide the adult corrections
commission "with all personnel, supplies and equipment, and other administrative
services as may be required to enable the commission to perform its duties."
22. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
23. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, §§ 4, 7, amending MmN. STAT. §§ 637.02,
.12 (1957).
24. Mnmn. STAT. § 637.10 (1957).
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vision over paroled and discharged convicts and probationers and, when
deemed necessary for that purpose, may appoint state agents. . . . Every
such agent or person shall perform such duties as the commissioner may
prescribe in behalf of or in the supervision of probationers and prisoners
paroled or discharged from the state prison, the state reformatory for men,
or the state reformatory for women and any other adult correctional
facilities .... 25
Again, in amending section 610.38 of the Minnesota Statutes
which, with other sections of chapter 610, deals with the power of
district courts to place convicted persons on probation, the "com-
missioner of corrections" was substituted for the "state board of
parole." It thus authorizes the district court to place a convicted
person in certain counties on probation "under the supervision of the
commissioner of corrections. . . ." The amended section now con-
cludes: "The commissioner of corrections shall act as director of
probation and parole and, for the purpose of carrying out the pro-
visions of sections 610.87 to 610.39, the commissioner of corrections
is authorized and empowered to provide such state agents." 2
These sections thus seem to remove from the jurisdiction of the
adult corrections commission the power of the former parole board
to appoint probation and parole agents and the responsibility for
their supervision. The function of the adult corrections commission
appears to be confined to the determination of when parole shall be
granted, the conditions and terms thereof, and when a discharge of
the parolee should be issued. The powers of appointment and super-
vision of the agents are conferred upon the commissioner.
The act does not reserve to the adult corrections commission, as
it did to the youth conservation commission, "policy matters and
decisions pertaining to the care, treatment, and disposition" either
as to persons in institutions or those placed on parole. However, the
necessity of a close working relationship between the commission
and the other branches of the department, noted in connection with
the youth conservation commission, is of course equally applicable
on the adult side. As indicated in connection with the youth conser-
vation division,"r these powers of the commissioner may be dele-
gated. The act provides:
Subject to the provisions of this act and to other applicable laws, the com-
missioner of corrections is authorized to organize the department and to
employ such officers, employees, and agents as he may deem necessary to
discharge the functions of his department, define the duties of such
officers, employees, and agents and to delegate to them any of his powers,
duties, and responsibilities, subject to his control and under such condi-
tions as he may prescribe.28
25. Minn. Lawcs 1959, ch. 263, § 6.
26. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 9.
27. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
28. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 263, § 1(3).
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These powers of delegation are in merely permissive terms - that is,
he may exercise them in his discretion subject to the provision that
he shall establish a division of adult corrections and a division of
youth conservation. In the interest of efficiency, however, the follow-
ing authority is granted: "When not prohibited by law, and when
special circumstances warrant, the commissioner of corrections may
direct that personnel, agents and facilities of one division shall be
utilized in carrying out the duties of the other division." 29
Finally, it should be noted that sentences of district courts con-
tinue to commit adult persons convicted of crimes to the institutions
rather than to the department, division, or commission. As the new
department of corrections takes concrete administrative form, it may
well be that some modification of this sentencing procedure should
be considered along the lines prevailing in the youth conservation
act.
Governor Freeman has appointed to the position of commissioner
of corrections, Mr. Will Turnbladh, formerly director of the National
Probation and Parole Association and a man who, by his vast experi-
ence, has earned an enviable national reputation in the correctional
field. Under his guidance, the development of the corrections depart-
ment and its divisions will assuredly be the best possible. Although
experience undoubtedly will point up a need for changes in the act,
the adoption of the act and the appointment of Mr. Turnbladh may
properly be regarded as the beginning of a new era in this state in
the field of criminal correction. There will not only be more effective
administration, but the state's program will have a purpose and
direction which it has never had before and which no other state has
thus far achieved.
II. RURAL PROBATION SERVICE
For the first time in the history of this state, all juvenile courts
must be provided with probation services, effective July 1, 1960. The
great improvement by the extension of this facility is indicated by the
following description of conditions in 1957 made by the Commission
on Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, and Corrections:
As long ago as 1899 Minnesota became the fourth state in the Union
to authorize courts to grant probation and to appoint probation officers.
But this early foresight had little practical effect, for 50 years later only
seven of the 87 counties had hired local probation officers for juveniles.
Following the impetus given to improved care of delinquent children by
the establishment of the Youth Conservation Commission in 1947, the
number of counties with some sort of locally provided probation services
has gradually risen to 17. Of these, three have half-time services; one has
one-quarter time services; and three counties jointly employ two probation
officers. Insofar as they have any kind of probation services for juveniles,
29. Ibid.
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the remaining 70 counties obtain it from YCC parole agents, from the staff
of the County Welfare Boards, from the judge, the sheriff, members of the
clergy, teachers, businessmen, and other volunteers. 3 0
The new act applies only to counties with under 100,000 population.
The three large metropolitan centers thus excluded maintain fully
developed and generally adequate probation departments under
special laws applicable to these counties.
Several principles underlie the legislation which was thus enacted.
One is that the granting of probation to a juvenile found delinquent
is a local responsibility and can usually be most effectively carried
out on the local level; this can be best developed by permitting the
judge to select his own probation officer. A second principle is that
those selected as probation officers should have the qualifications
necessary for the position. But even with the best of qualifications,
an agent working in isolation in a county needs the contacts and
advice available to him in the larger probation departments. On the
state level, the natural agency to provide the necessary supervision
is the division of youth conservation. A third principle pursued is
that the probation and parole work of the division of youth conser-
vation should be integrated with the probation services within each
county, thus avoiding duplication of effort and employment by both
the state and local governments of personnel performing similar
duties. Finally, the act assumes that the youths of every county are
entitled to the benefits of probation service and that, therefore, no
county should be free to forego providing it.
The act provides three methods by which probation services will
be provided.31 One is through appointment by the juvenile court of
one or more full-time, salaried probation officers. The second permits
the county welfare boards of two or more counties to authorize their
juvenile court judges to jointly appoint such an officer to serve the
respective counties.32 Under the third method, the county may ask
that these services be provided by the division of youth conserva-
tion and, after July 1, 1960, the division must provide them
regardless of request. When provided by the division, they must
be paid for by the county based on an estimate made by the
division of the cost of the services in fact rendered.-
With respect to the number of agents required, the act sets the
standard of one probation officer for each 35,000 of population in the
county if the county contains a city of 10,000 or more. 4 Appointment
30. RFPORT OF THE MINNESOTA CoMMIssION ON JUVENILE DELINQUENcY, ADULT
CGusm, AND ComnEcToNs, ANTn-SOcAL BE AvIoR AND ITs CON'rOL n; MnrE-
SOTA 95 (1957).
31. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(1), amending MIN. STAT. § 260.09 (1957).
32. The counties had this power prior to the act. See MINN. STAT. § 260.09
(1957).
33. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(4).
34. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(2).
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must be made from a list supplied by the state civil service depart-
ment of candidates who have qualified by taking the required civil
service examination."
.. The agents appointed by the juvenile courts are under a duty to
provide probation and parole services to wards of the youth con-
servation commission resident in the counties they serve, and shall
act under the orders of said commission in reference to any ward
committed to their care by the commission." 36 For this service, and
without regard to whether or not it was utilized in any given period,
each county in which such service is available will receive from the
state annually a sum equal to the county's population multiplied by
ten cents37 The agents must also make monthly and annual reports
to the commission "containing such information on number of cases
cited to the juvenile court, offenses, adjudications, dispositions, and
related matters as may be required by the youth conservation
commission." 3 8
With such a close working relationship established between the
division of youth conservation and the juvenile court probation
officers, it may be expected that the juvenile court judges will con-
sult with the division in the selection of probation officers and in
developing policies and programs best suited to make the probation
of youths in their communities as successful as possible. In turn, the
division may be expected to make available to the juvenile courts,
by way of suggestion and advice, the benefits of its knowledge and
understanding gained from its extensive experience in dealing with
delinquent youths.
In thus providing complete probation service to the juvenile courts
of the state, the new act has offered a practical program of local
responsibility joined in a working and practical relationship with the
principal state agency, the division of youth conservation. In any
development of an integrated program of treatment of delinquent
youths, that kind of cooperative effort is indispensable.
III. REsVISE JUVENILE COURT CODE
A. Underlying Principles
Another major achievement of the 1959 legislative session was the
revision of the juvenile court code.39 This new code was the product
35. ibid.
36. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(3).
37. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(5).
38. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 698, § 3(3). It will be noted that the act speaks in terms
of the youth conservation commission. In view of the provisions of the depart-
ment of corrections act, discussed earlier in this Article, this must be construed to
refer to the division of youth conservation which, through its deputy director, now
has the responsibility for the administration of the probation and parole services
relating to juveniles. See text commencing at note 10 supra.
39. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685.
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of an interim legislative commission on public welfare assisted by an
advisory committee whose members represented a wide variety of
groups and agencies concerned with the various aspects of juvenile
court work. The committee relied heavily on the recently revised
Wisconsin children's code.40 The Wisconsin code, in turn, reflects
the major influence of the Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing
with Children, published in 1954 by the Children's Bureau of the
Federal Government. The latter publication was, of course, also
relied on by the Minnesota committee. There was need for a revision
of the Minnesota code, for the former code had been enacted in 1917,
and frequent changes had been made in it from time to time. As a
result, it was confused in many respects, did not cover certain im-
portant problems, and failed to reflect certain accepted principles
with respect to juvenile courts which have evolved as a product of
experience.
The new code, as did the former one, deals with three areas of
problems relating to juveniles. One area covers neglected children
and involves such problems as failure to provide subsistence, educa-
tion, physical welfare, and moral and spiritual training. Another re-
lates to dependency, where the child suffers from want of care and
sustenance because of the inability of his parents or those responsible
for him to provide for him properly. The third concerns delin-
quency. The fact that these three areas are combined in a single code
and that most of its provisions apply regardless which of the three
is involved in a given proceeding evidences the belief of the drafters
that in all three areas there exists an essentially common purpose -
the welfare of the child. Hence, the authors of the new code are able
to state its general purpose as applied to any proceeding brought
under it as follows:
The purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each
minor under the jurisdiction of the court the care and guidance, preferably
in his own home, as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the state; to preserve and
strengthen the minor's family ties whenever possible, removing him from
the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety and protection
of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal; and,
when the minor is removed from his own family, to secure for him custody,
care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents.41
Not only is there present in all three areas the common purpose of
protecting the welfare of the child, but elements of neglect and
dependency on the one hand and delinquency on the other are often
causally interrelated, with neglect and dependency constituting the
40. Wis. STAT. ch. 48 (1955).
41. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 1(2).
[Vol. 44:363
DELINQUENCY AND CRIME
explanation for the delinquent behavior. Still it is important to
differentiate the area of delinquency from those of neglect and
dependency. Delinquent conduct, whether or not the product of
neglect or dependency, presents special problems which require
distinct remedial measures. One authority on the subject has sug-
gested that "if the behavior is dangerous to the community, or is
intolerable behavior, delinquency is indicated. If, however, the child,
and not the community, is in danger, the child needs protection, but
the delinquency is not indicated."42
(1) Meaning of Delinquency
Delinquency is defined in the code as follows:
"Delinquent child" means a child:
(a) Who has violated any state or local law or ordinance, except as
rovided in section 30, subdivision 1;
fb) Who has violated a federal law or a law of another state and whose
case has been referred to the juvenile court; or
(c) Who is habitually truant from school; or
(d) Who is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian, or other custodian by
reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient; or
(e) Who habitually deports himself in a manner that is injurious or
dangerous to himself and others.43
This represents a narrowing and sharpening of the concept of
delinquency as compared with the former code.44 A common criti-
cism of many juvenile court acts has been that the definition of
delinquency has been so broad as to apply to insignificant conduct
of which every healthy and normal child is at one time or another
guilty, but which is not indicative of any genuine delinquency prob-
lem.4 5 Clauses (c), (d), and (e) meet this criticism. Each requires
a course of conduct which, if engaged in by a child, would indicate
the need for intervention by the state to correct the developing
behavior-pattern. Clause (c) requires that the child be habitually
truant; clause (d) requires that he be wayward or habitually dis-
obedient and, hence, uncontrolled; clause (e) specifies that he must
habitually deport himself in a harmful manner. In each instance, an
42. RuBur, CRIe AND JuvENL DELINQUENCY 48 (1958).
43. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 2(5).
44. The term "delinquent child" means a child who violates any law of this
state or any city or village ordinance; or who is habitually truant or incorrigible;
or who knowingly associates with vicious or immoral persons; or who without
just cause and without the consent of his parents, guardian, or other custodian
absents himself from his home or place of abode, or who knowingly visits any
place which exists, or where his presence is permitted in violation of law; or
who habitually uses obscene, profane, or indecent language; or who is guilty
of lewd or immoral conduct involving another person.
MxIN. STAT. § 260.01 (1957).
45. BLOCx & FLYNN, DELINQUENCY, THE JuVENILE OF7ENDEia IN Am cA. TODAY
ch. 1 (1956); RuBN, op. cit. supra note 42, ch. 3.
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isolated act of misbehavior is not sufficient.48 There must be a course
of conduct showing the need for corrective measures by the state.
Clauses (a) and (b), however, do not reveal the same clarity of
purpose. In accordance with the majority of juvenile court acts, these
clauses literally appear to require only a violation of some law,
whether it be federal, state, local or municipal. There has been al-
most no judicial interpretation of provisions of this character. Ob-
viously, there may be technical violations of laws and ordinances,
which, whether committed by youths or adults, do not evidence
delinquent or immoral behavior and which do not warrant the appli-
cation of the processes of the juvenile court. Clauses of this kind, it
is believed, should be interpreted in the light of the purposes of the
act and construed to apply primarily to those cases where the viola-
tion in fact evidences a disposition or mode of behavior which can
justifiably be characterized as delinquent and which properly calls
for the protective and rehabilitative measures available to the
juvenile court. Ordinarily, the commission of a felony would be
sufficient, without more, to show that the child is delinquent. But in
the area of petty offenses, greater care should be exercised to deter-
mine that the offense does in fact evidence a delinquent disposition.47
The approach which might well be taken in the latter cases is
46. People v. Pikunas, 260 N.Y. 72, 182 N.E. 675 (1932), in which the court
said:
The Children's Court Act (Laws 1930, c. 393, sec. 2, par. 2 [d]) defines
"delinquent child," . . . as a child "who, without just cause and without the
consent of his parent, parents, guardians or other custodian, repeatedhj deserts
his home or place of abode," and thus applies to habitual truancy and not to a
single act of truancy. The evidence in this case, so far as set forth in the record,
indicates but one absence from home, accompanied, it is true, by an act or acts
of sexual intercourse with a man who, defendant says, forced her to stay in a
car with him. A child who is forced into a car and taken away from home
without her consent cannot be said to "desert her home without good and
sufficient cause," and one such act in its worst aspect is not to be described as
repeatedly deserting one's home.
See also In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 115 Adt. 730 (1921), quoted in note 47 infra.
47. In Krell v. Sanders, 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959), the court observed:
There is no proof of the charge made in the complaint that appellant was
involved with others in an attack on Stewart which resulted in a fracture of
his jaw. The charge that appellant was a delinquent child because of this
alleged occurrence or otherwise was not established. The evidence is quite to
the contrary. There was no previous misconduct of appellant claimed or shown.
It was established at the hearing that appellant had. no record of improper
conduct and that his school experience was acceptable and satisfactory both as
to comportment and scholarship. A single violation of a law of the state by a
minor does not always permit of a conclusion that the transgressor is a juvenile
delinquent. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at -, 96 N.W.2d at 222. The court quoted from In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 504,
115 At. 730, 733 (1921), as follows: "So, when analyzed, we find here only a single
act of disobedience as a basis of the charge of delinquency. This was not enough.
A child is not incorrigible who disobeys but once." Krell v. Sanders, supra at -,
96 N.W.2d at 222.
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suggested by the provisions of the new code relating to traffic
offenses. There has been considerable dissatisfaction in Minnesota
and other states with leaving to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
traffic offenses committed by youths. The reasons for this dissatis-
faction were recently analyzed by the Minnesota Commission on
Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, and Corrections, 4 which con-
cluded that these cases should remain in the juvenile courts but that
a traffic offense should not be regarded as evidencing delinquency
unless the court specifically so finds. This point of view was incor-
porated in the new juvenile code, which provides:
A child who violates a state or local traffic law, ordinance, or regulation,
shall be adjudicated a "juvenile traffic offender" and shall not be adjudi-
cated delinquent, unless the court finds as a further fact that the child
is also delinquent within the meaning and purpose of the laws relating to
juvenile courts. 49
Disposition of the case, once a child is found to be a "juvenle
traffic offender," is more restrictive than where he is found to be
"delinquent." The court may "reprimand the child and counsel with
the child and his parents"; continue the case for a reasonable period
during which the conditions of the use of the car may be restricted;
require the child to attend a drivers' school if one is available; or
recommend to the highway department suspension or, under cer-
tain conditions, revocation of the child's driver's license.50
The juvenile court also has the power to transfer the case to any
court with a salaried judge, "if after a hearing, the court finds that
the welfare of a juvenile traffic offender or the public safety would
be better served under the laws controlling adult traffic violators.
. . ." 51 In counties with under 80,000 population, the probate courts
now have the jurisdiction of municipal courts,52 and all probate
judges are now compensated by a salary and are not dependent on
ees.53 Hence, the juvenile court judge in a county with less than
80,000 population has several alternative means available to him of
disposing of a juvenile traffic offense. He may retain the case as a
juvenile judge and dispose of the case within the limits fixed by the
new code for cases where no delinquency appears. Or he may, after
a hearing, transfer the case to himself in his capacity as judge of the
probate court exercising its criminal jurisdiction. He may, of course,
also transfer the case to another court which has jurisdiction, such
as a municipal court, if its judge is paid a salary and not by fees. In
48. See BRPoRT oF =h MINNESOTA Coin.mssION ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
AnuLT CnmE, AN CoRREcmoNs, SAFE DRvIN BY JuVENMEs IN MnnsOTA (1959).
49. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 30(1).
50. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 30(5).
51. Minn. Laws 1959, cl. 685, § 30(4).
52. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 494, § 1(1).
53. Minn. Laws 1959, cl. 539, §§ 1-2.
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practice, the last course ought seldom to be resorted to; both the
public and the child are entitled to the experienced understanding
and wisdom of the court especially established to deal with youths,
even though no more is involved than the commission of a traffic
offense. In counties over 80,000 population, of necessity, the transfer
must be made to another court and ought, therefore, seldom to be
made. In no event, under the act, is a juvenile traffic offender to be
exposed to the evils too often associated with justices of the peace
and the fee-paid municipal court judge.
The new code assumes that, except in the occasional case, the
juvenile traffic offender will not be transferred to another court and
will not be adjudicated a delinquent. He is simply a juvenile traffic
offender and will be dealt with as such.
It is believed that a similar approach might well be developed
under the act with respect to other petty offenses, although the pro-
cedures for doing so are not as well spelled out in the act. In all cases,
an initial decision must be made whether any petition at all should
be filed. With the services of probation officers now available in all
counties, an intelligent screening of cases is now possible, so that
those cases may be eliminated without any proceeding where an
offense may technically have been committed but where the youth's
realization that his conduct subjected him to the possibility of
juvenile court action sufficiently serves the needs of the case. In other
cases some proceeding in juvenile court will appear warranted. Ex-
perience has shown that in the large majority of cases coming beforejuvenile courts, the commission of the offense is not in dispute. In
such cases the following provision can be resorted to without a find-
ing of delinquency:
When it is in the best interests of the child to do so and when [the] child
has admitted the allegations contained in the petition before the judge or
referee, but before a finding of delinquency has been entered, the court
may continue the case for a period not to exceed 90 days. During this con-
tinuance the court may enter an order in accordance with the provisions of
subdivision 1, clauses (a) t54] or (b) 051 or enter an order to hold the
child in detention for a period not to exceed 15 days on any one order for
the purpose of completing any consideration, or any investigation or
examination ordered in accordance with the provisions of section 21.56
54. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1) (a). This clause authorizes the court to
"counsel the child or his parents, guardian, or custodian."
55. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(b). This clause authorizes the court to
"place the child under the supervision of a probation officer or other suitable person
in his own home under conditions" governing his conduct and that of his parents,
guardian, or custodian.
56. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(3).
Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(1) provides that "hearings may be continued
or adjourned from time to time and, in the interim, the court may make such orders
as it deems in the best interests of the minor in accordance with the provisions of
sections 1 to 44."
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The period of the continuance having been concluded without fur-
ther complications, the case can then be dismissed without an
adjudication of delinquency.
(2) Nature of Proceeding
In considering procedural problems under juvenile court acts,
there has been a tendency to classify the proceedings as either civil
or criminal. The conclusion usually reached is that it is not a criminal
proceeding but is civil in nature, its object being the protection and
care of the child and his restoration to society as a law-abiding citi-
zen. Punishment for a criminal act is not involved. Thus, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has said:
[F]or its protection and the good of the child, the state may, through its
courts, place the child in charge of some person or institution for proper
training and support. It matters little whether the danger to the child and
society comes because of the fault of others or that of the child. The right
of the state to step in and save the child is the same. In that view the
restraint put on the child cannot be regarded as punishment for crime.57
This position is re-enforced by the new act, which provides that "A
violation of a state or local law or ordinance by a child before be-
coming 18 years of age is not a crime unless the juvenile court refers
the matter to the appropriate prosecuting authority. . . .",s The
proceeding has also been characterized as involving the guardian-
ship of the child and, hence, within the formerly restricted jurisdic-
tion of probate courts.5"
Yet, the full logical implications of characterizing the proceedings
as civil have not been followed. Courts have found it difficult to
ignore the fact that the proceedings in which delinquency is charged
commonly involve a charge that a serious crime has been committed
and that the right of the state to interfere with the liberty of the child
and the right of the parents to his custody are involved. Hence, a
tendency is present to insist on some of the protections afforded an
adult in a criminal proceeding. Typical is the following observation:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to be
a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of a crime,
nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a
challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and will
not shut their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.
This confers the power to continue a case, usually accorded any court. During
the continuance under this provision, the court would not be authorized to make
the kind of orders authorized in Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(3).
57. Peterson v. McAuliffe, 151 Minn. 467, 469, 187 N.W. 226 (1922). See also
State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957); State ex
rel. White v. Patterson, 188 Minn. 492, 249 N.W. 187 (1933); State ex rel. Olson
v. Brown, 50 Minn. 353, 52 N.W. 935 (1892).
58. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 32(1).
59. State ex rel. White v. Patterson, 188 Minn. 492, 249 N.W. 187 (1933).
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It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon a
charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the
character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor. Let
him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or obtain a position
of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted with his juvenile
court record. And further, as in this case, the minor is taken from his
family, deprived of his liberty and confined in a state institution. True, the
design of the Juvenile Court Act is intended to be salutary, and every
effort should be made to further its legitimate purpose, but never should
it be made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional
right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult. 60
These attempts to classify a juvenile court proceeding as falling
within some already-established category such as criminal or civil
seem unwise and unnecessary. There is always the danger that they
will result in the application of principles and procedures not suited
to these proceedings. A juvenile court proceeding should be dealt
with on its own merits and on the basis of its own special problems.
Obviously, it is not a criminal proceeding. But neither is it merely a
civil one. The proceeding involves state action in which the child
and his parents face the prospect of an adjudication carrying with it
unfavorable moral implications and social stigmatization, not to
mention supervision, confinement of the child, and other limitations
on his liberty. Such an adjudication ought not to be made lightly;
and the procedures established should assure that they are not light-
ly made. Some of the protections afforded in a criminal case for this
purpose may be needed also in a juvenile court case, but it is not
necessary or desirable to characterize it as criminal in order to arrive
at this result. These protections should be found to be implicit in
the kind of fair hearing intended by the legislation establishing the
juvenile court and its procedures.
One further general observation should be made about the nature
of juvenile court hearings. Only limited reliance is placed upon the
adversary method of presenting the case to the court. The proceed-
ing is not entitled either "The State v. Johnny Smith," as in a criminal
proceeding, or "William Doe, complainant v. Johnny Smith, defend-
ant," as in a civil action. Instead, the title is "In the matter of the
welfare of [Johnny Smith]."6 ' A petition is involved, but its purpose
is not to serve as one of a series of pleadings to frame issues but to
inform the child and other interested parties of the nature of the
charge of delinquency being made which will be the basis of the
ensuing hearing. There is no arraignment or plea as in a criminal
case, or answer as in a civil action. They are not needed, since neither
the child nor others are regarded as adversaries. Instead of a contest
between adversaries, the hearing is intended to be more in the
60. In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952).
61. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 17(3).
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nature of an investigation in which the judge and his staff have the
principal responsibility for ascertaining the facts and determining
the proper disposition to be made. The investigation, of course, in-
cludes the right of the child and other interested parties to present
fully their contentions and evidence. Legislation such as the new
code must be construed to have been drawn with this kind of hearing
in mind.
B. Initiating Proceedings
There are two ways in which a case may come before the juvenile
court in delinquency cases. One is by the filing of a petition charging
delinquency, made by "some reputable person . . . having know-
ledge of a child . . . who appears to be delinquent . ... 2 Upon
filing of the petition, a time for hearing is set and a summons is issued
to the person having custody or control of the child, directing him to
appear with the child at the appointed time and place.63 Notice of
the hearing must also be served on certain other persons, such as
"parents, guardians, or spouse of a legitimate minor or the mother,
guardian, or spouse of an illegitimate minor," 14 and also on the
county welfare board if the proceeding was not initiated by it.6" A
minimum of twenty-four hours must elapse between the time of
service of the summons or notice and the hearing or, if served the
day before, the hearing must be postponed at least a day.66 Provision
is made for both personal and substituted service.67
The other manner in which a case may come before the juvenile
court is by way of transfer from another court before which the child
has appeared on a criminal charge. The latter court cannot hear such
a charge. As under the previous code, courts other than the juvenile
court do not have jurisdiction of any criminal proceeding involving
a minor, unless it has been transferred to them by the juvenile
62. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 17(1).
63. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 18(1).
64. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 18(2).
65. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 18(3).
66. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 19(1)(a).
67. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 19(1) (b) provides:
If the court is satisfied that personal service of the summons or notice cannot
well be made, it shall make an order providing for the service of summons or
notice by certified mail addressed to the last known addresses of such persons,
and by one weeks' published notice as provided in Minnesota Statutes, Section
645.11. A copy of the notice shall be sent by certified mail at least five days
before the time of the hearing or fourteen if mailed to addresses outside the
state.
Of course, substituted service should not be resorted to, in order to bring into
court the person having custody of the minor. The act assumes that the child will
be personally before the court at least in delinquency cases. There is no provision
for adjudication by default. The act provides that "in any case when it appears to
the court that the service will be ineffectual . . . the court may issue a warrant
for the minor." Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 20.
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court."8 The new code explicitly provides that "the juvenile court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any
child who is alleged to be delinquent, [or] a juvenile traffic offender
...and in proceedings concerning any minor alleged to have been
delinquent prior to having become eighteen years of age ." 69 There-
fore, when it appears that a youth under the specified age is before
a court other than a juvenile court, that court has no alternative but
to make the transfer. This is true regardless of the nature of the
offense charged; the requirement is jurisdictional. Should the court
proceed with the case even though unaware of the age of the youth,
any resulting conviction would be void and any detention of the
youth thereunder illegal.7 °
The probate courts in counties with under 80,000 population now
have jurisdiction of minor criminal offenses, similar to the corre-
sponding jurisdiction of municipal courts under the general munici-
pal court act.7 ' Minors may, therefore, appear before them charged
with criminal offenses which fall within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court and which the judge, therefore, ought to hear in that
capacity. The requirement that the case be transferred to the juve-
nile court calendar of the court would appear to have been contem-
plated in the act. It is not enough that the judge hearing criminal
cases is also the judge who presides in juvenile court cases. The act
contemplates that before there is a decision that the case will be
heard as a criminal case, there will be a hearing on the desirability
of its being so considered.72 For the judge to announce from the
bench, when hearing criminal cases, that he will hear the criminal
case as though he had made a transfer from the juvenile court cal-
endar would by-pass this requirement.
The transfer is made by the transferring court's "filing with the
...juvenile court a certificate indicating the name, age, and resi-
dence of the minor, the names and addresses of his parent or guard-
ian, if known, and the reasons for his appearance in court, together
with all papers, documents and testimony connected" with the
case.73 The act states that "the certificate has the effect of a petition
filed in the juvenile court," but the judge, in his discretion, may
direct the filing of a new petition.74 The meaning and significance of
the certificate will be considered in connection with petitions, dis-
cussed later in this Article.
68. State ex tel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
69. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 13.
70. State ex tel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
71. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 494, § 1.
72. See text commencing at note 152 infra.
73. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 14(2). What the phrase "if known" qualifies
is not clear from the subdivision.
74. Ibid.
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In addition to the issuance of the certificate, the transferring court
is required to take certain steps in effecting the transfer. It should
direct "the minor to be taken immediately to the juvenile court and
in no event shall detain the minor for longer than 48 hours after the
appearance of the minor in the transferring court." " The act appears
to contemplate immediate transfer to the juvenile court, and any
delay must be justified, such as by the fact that the juvenile court is
closed over a holiday or weekend. But in any case, the period of
detention cannot be longer than forty-eight hours.
The requirement that the transferring court must order "the minor
to be taken immediately to the juvenile court" appears inconsistent
with the following provisions:
The transferring court may release the minor to the custody of his parent,
guardian, custodian, or other person designated by the court on the con-
&tion that the minor will appear in juvenile court as directed. The trans-
ferring court may require the person given custody of the minor to post
such bail or bond as may be approved by the court which shall be forfeited
to the juvenile court if the minor does not appear as directed. The trans-
feing court may also release the minor on his own promise to appear in
juvenile court.76
However, the provisions probably can be reconciled in the following
manner. The purpose of the requirement that the minor be taken
immediately to the juvenile court is to prevent any unwarranted
detention at the hands of the transferring court or the law enforce-
ment officers. The objective is prompt transfer of the case to the
juvenile court. If the last-quoted provisions are resorted to and the
youth is not placed in detention, the same urgency of action in
making the transfer is not required. If the child is placed in detention
pending the transfer, it must be in a place specified by the act as one
proper for juveniles. 7
C. The Petition
With respect to the contents of the petition, the new code
provides:
The petition shall set forth plainly:
(a) The facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court;
(b) The name, date of birth, residence, and post office address of the
child;
(c) The names, residences, and post office addresses of the parents;
(d) The name, residence, and post office address of his guardian if there
be one, of the person having custody or control of the child, and of the
75. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 14(3).
76. Ibid.
77. See Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 26. There are corresponding limitations on
the place and period of detention where the law-enforcement officer takes a child
into custody and proceedings are brought directly in the juvenile court. See Minn.
Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 26.
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nearest known relative if no parent or guardian can be found;
(e) The spouse of the child, if there be one. If any of the facts required
by the petition are not known or cannot be ascertained by the petitioner,
the petition shall so state.78
Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) appear to be aimed primarily at
providing, at an early and convenient point, the information speci-
fied for the use of the court and its personnel and to some extent to
indicate where and on whom service of summons and notices should
be made. Clause (a) is the important part of the section. It requires
that the facts bringing the child within the jurisdiction of the court
must not only be set forth but that they must be set forth plainly.
This varies to some extent from the former requirement.79 Neither
sheds much light on what is required, and the authors of both were
probably unaware of the difficulties encountered in Code pleading
in civil actions where the requirement was that the pleader must
state "facts constituting the cause of action."80
There are few judicial opinions in which the requirements of an
adequate petition are analyzed. It would seem that the test should
be whether the petition sufficently indicates what misconduct is
proposed to be shown at the hearing as establishing the delinquency
of the child. For this purpose a detailed statement is ordinarily not
needed. At the same time, the statement should not be couched in
such broad terms that it is meaningless. Thus, a general charge that
the child is a delinquent would be insufficient. Equally inadequate
would be a statement that the child has committed a criminal act or
engaged in criminal conduct, without additional specification of the
act or conduct. Such allegations give no lead as to what is intended
to be proved.8' When the charge involves the commission of a
78. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 17(3).
79. Formerly, the petition was required to set forth "the facts of the alleged
dependency, neglect or delinquency." MmN. STAT. § 260.07 (1957).
80. See 1 Pmsit, MI-NEOTA PLED ING §§ 22, 52 (4th ed. 1956).
81. Hewitt v. Hollaran, 56 N.J. Super. 372, 153 A.2d 371 (1959) bears some
analogy, although it involved a proceeding by a town in the juvenile and domestic
relations court to compel a husband to support his wife. The complaint alleged the
failure to support, stating it was contrary to "Revised Statutes, 1951 Title 44:1-1 to
44:1-160 Approved December 20,1947 and the supplements thereto and amendments
thereof." Id. at 377, 153 A.2d at 373.
The court observed:
[N]o defendant should be required to go through 160 sections of a statute, plus
all "the supplements thereto and amendments thereof," to find out what he is
charged with, especially when the 160 sections and "the supplements thereto
and amendments thereof' contain various and differing bases of liability....
Due process means more than mere notice to a person that he is a defendant-
he is entitled to a complaint which informs him of the legal and factual basis
of the charge which he is called upon to face....
It has been pointed out that our Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, as
well as our municipal courts, have come of age; and that they possess far greater
powers of fine, imprisonment, and the imposition of money judgments than in
88 [Vol. 44:363
1960] DELINQUENCY AND CPIME
criminal offense, the crime committed should be stated with some
degree of specificity. The following should suffice:
The child above named is a delinquent child in that on the
day of 19-.-, at , Minn., he [stole an automobile
belonging to ], [broke and entered into a store belonging
to with intent to commit a crime therein], [assaulted and
beat one John Jones], or the like.
Of course, the petition can set forth as many misdeeds as may be
desired to show the delinquent character of the child. The phrase
"is a delinquent child" is believed to be an important allegation
which should appear in all petitions, since the child's being delin-
quent is the basic reason for bringing him into court. Where the
misconduct charged is not of itself indicative of delinquency, some
such allegation of delinquency may be essential to the validity of
the petition.82
Where the charge of delinquency does not involve a criminal act
but relates rather to "habitual" truancy or to the fact that the child
is uncontrolled "by reason of being wayward or habitually diso-
bedient," or that he "habitually deports himself in a manner that is
days gone by.... With that maturity, and with those powers, there has come
to these courts the correlative responsibility to see to it that their pleadings and
their procedures comport with the highest standards of due process.
Id. at 877-78, 153 A.2d at 37--74. See also In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 252, 63
N.W.2d 151, 156 (1954): "There must be a reasonably definite charge. ....
Accord, People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
And the Louisiana court has observed:
Counsel's complaint here is that the petition merely states that the child is in
need of the protection of the court and that it fails to give any facts upon which
this conclusion is based.
This point might have been well taken if it had been raised when the case
was first heard but, since evidence was adduced at the trial without any ob-
jection, such evidence effected an enlargement of the pleadings and supplied any
deficiencies therein. The statutory requirement that the facts, upon which the
petition is founded, be set forth plainly is to provide notice to all persons
interested in the child of the grounds upon which the hearing is being held so
that they may be prepared to combat the charges, if they see fit.
In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 579, 73 So. 2d 466, 468 (1954).
An objection is necessary raising the inadequacy of the petition. See State v.
Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
82. Compare State v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 142, 262 Pac. 168, 171 (1927),
stating:
The manner of proceeding is by petition ...which must set forth, not only
the facts on which it is alleged that the child is delinquent, but that it is for the
best interest of the child and the state that the child be taken from its parent
or parents, or its guardian, and that such parent or parents, or guardian is unfit,
or an improper custodian of the child, or is unwilling or unable to care for,
protect, train, educate, control, and discipline the child. The failure to include
these latter allegations renders a petition insufficient, and a judgment based on
such a petition is void.
The requirements thus applied were of statutory origin. See MoNT. GEN. STAT.
§ 12278 (1927).
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injurious or dangerous to himself or others," 83 the nature of the con-
duct charged is such that it can be stated only in general terms.
Stating the charge in the terms of the statute should be sufficient.
To do more would entail the relating of evidentiary details which
would serve little purpose except possibly to involve the proceeding
in technical arguments about confining the hearing to the details
alleged.84 But since these allegations are very general, some limit to
the proof intended should be indicated by setting out the dates be-
tween which the delinquent conduct is alleged to have occurred. The
following is an example of this type of case:
The above named child is a delinquent child in that between
19-, and -, 19 -, he [was and continues to be habitually
truant from school], [was and continues to be uncontrolled by his parents
(guardian) (uncle with whom he resides, his parents bemig deceased or as
the case may be) by reason of being (wayward) (habitually disobedient)],
[has deported, and continues to deport, himself in a manner that is in-jurious or dangerous to himself or others.]
In view of the generality of these allegations, if the child, his repre-
sentative, or others affected insist that by reason thereof they have
not been able to prepare for the hearing, the court should be liberal
in providing a more detailed indication of what is being claimed
against the child and in granting a continuance if requested.
The purpose of the petition being to inform those who may oppose
it of what they may expect to meet at the hearing, the evidence
introduced at the hearing must necessarily be confined to the charges
made in the petition. Otherwise, the requirement that there be a
petition would be quite pointless. The petition would afford little
assistance or protection to the parties if it alleged a given charge and
the evidence produced at the hearing proceeded to prove another.85
83. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, §§ 2(5)(c)-(e).
84. See Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 77, 16 N.W.2d 390, 393 (1944), where the
court stated:
[Tihe language of the statute was used in charging this boy with being a
delinquent child. It is contended that this fails to comply with the statutory
requirement that the petition must briefly allege the facts which bring the child
within the definition of the charge. The petition does allege that the child
habitually deports himself so as to injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others. This allegation is in the words of the statute and it is not
considered that the petitioner is to set forth in detail the various acts of the
child bringing him within the statute.
85. Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), stating:
The evidence given in such cases should also be confined to the charges
alleged in the petition filed in the case .... It was likewise error for the trial
court . . . to hear and consider evidence about extraneous matters and mis-
conduct of the child with which it was not charged in the petition presented in
the case.
On the general rule against variances in the proof in civil cases, see 1 Prmsi,
MniNsoTA PLrANo § 39 (4th ed. 1956).
That failure to object may waive the objection, see note 81 supra. However, where
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These requirements and limitations should not cause any sub-
stantial problems for the juvenile courts. While the new code is
silent on the question of amendment of the petition, the court un-
doubtedly has inherent power, on application or on its own motion,
to cause the petition to be amended so as to allege new grounds for
the charge of delinquency, should it become evident that the in-
terests of the child and of the state demand it. If the petition is so
amended, the court should, upon the request of any party, grant a
continuance of the case for the purpose of meeting the new alle-
gations. 6
When a case comes before the juvenile court by transfer from
another court before which the child has been brought on a charge
of having committed a criminal offense, the act does not contemplate
the initial filing of a complaint. The relevant provision is:
The court transfers the case by filing with the judge or clerk of juvenile
court a certificate showing the name, age, and residence of the minor, the
names and addresses of his parent or guardian, if known, and the reasons
for his appearance in court, together with all papers, documents, and testi-
mony connected therewith. The certificate has the effect of a petition
filed in juvenile court, unless the judge of the juvenile court in his discre-
tion directs the filing of a new petition, which shall supersede the certificate
of transfer.8 7
Thus there is no requirement such as that applicable to petitions
that there be "set forth plainly the facts which bring the child within
the jurisdiction of the court." All that is needed is a certificate con-
taining, besides informational data, "the reasons for his appearance
in court." This certificate serves as the petition in the juvenile court.
It would seem, therefore, that it should be subject to the same mini-
the parties are not represented by counsel, a finding of waiver should be made with
caution. Compare State ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d
234 (1957), in which the mothers waiver of notice of hearing was held invalid.
86. See Harry v. State, 246 Wis. 69, 80, 16 N.W.2d 390, 395 (1944), in which
the court stated:
It is also contended that the court is limited to the charge contained in the
petition, and that the original petition charging this boy with being a delinquent
child limited the jurisdiction of the court to this particular charge. We do not
consider this to be correct. When the child is once brought before the court
and the facts are presented, the court may order the petition to be amended
and adjudge the child to be a "neglected," "dependent," or "delinquent" child,
as the facts warrant. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the law.
The purpose of the proceedings is to provide for the welfare of the child and to
remove him from unfortunate surroundings. When the facts indicate that the
child is not being properly reared or cannot be readily controlled, the child's
best interests demand that he be subject to wiser or stronger authority. The
only way this can be accomplished is to permit the court to proceed as the facts
warrant at the time the determination is made.
The quotation fails to give sufficient recognition to the necessity of providing parties
opposing the petition with an opportunity by way of a continuance to meet the
new charges introduced.
87. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 14(2).
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mum requirements, and that if the certificate does not meet these
standards, the court should direct a more adequate petition to be
filed, especially ff any party claims the evidence developed at the
juvenile court hearing contains charges of delinquency of which he
was not advised through the certificate.
A like problem is presented when the child comes before the
juvenile court charged with a traffic offense. Here, again, special
provisions apply with respect to the statement of the charge which
brings the child before the juvenile court. The act provides:
When a child is alleged to have violated any state or local traffic law,
ordinance, or regulation, the peace officer making the charge shall file a
signed copy of the notice to appear, as provided in . . .section 169.91,
with the juvenile court of the county in which the violation occurred, and
the notice to appear has the effect of a petition and gives the juvenile
court jurisdiction.88
The notice so contemplated is undoubtedly adequate to permit the
court to deal with the youth under the special provisions relating to
juvenile traffic offenders. But the act specifically provides that a
juvenile traffic offender is not a delinquent, unless there is a specific
finding by the court to that effect.89 Of course, such a finding must
be based on evidence introduced in the case which the youth or
other interested parties have the opportunity to dispute. Under the
principles already discussed, such evidence is not admissible, unless
it is in support of a charge made prior to the hearing and of which
the parties have been advised. Hence a new or supplemental petition
would be required in order to bring into the case the broader ques-
tion of the youth's delinquency.
D. The Hearing
Experience has shown that in a large majority of cases brought
before the juvenile court, there is no question raised concerning the
commission of the delinquent acts. It is conceded by all concerned
that the acts took place, and the only question before the court is the
proper disposition that should be made. The limitations on the
hearing here discussed will usually arise in those cases in which the
fact of the child's delinquency is in dispute. Thus the sources of
information which the judge may use in considering the disposition
to be made are much wider than are permissible in determining the
question of delinquency.9
88. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 30(2).
Under Mni. STAT. § 169.91 (1957), the required notice to appear "shall contain
the name and address of the person arrested, his drivers license, or chauffeur's license
number, the license number of his vehicle, the offense charged, and the time when
and the place he is to appear in court."
89. See text commencing at note 49 supra.
90. "Before making a disposition in a case ... the court may consider any
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Few provisions in the new code deal with the requirements of the
hearing. Those that appear are contained in a single section and, for
the most part, are applicable equally to neglect and dependency
cases as to those involving delinquency.9' The hearing is to be before
the judge rather than before a jury and is to be "conducted in an
informal manner." 9 2 These requirements undoubtedly contemplate
the kind of hearing that has been traditional with juvenile courts in
which the judge and his staff, rather than the parties, bear the
primary burden of ascertaining the facts. 3 The following provision
is an important one which settles a question which has frequently
come up in other states:
The minor, parent, guardian or custodian have the right to counsel. If
they desire counsel but are unable to employ it, the court shall appoint
counsel to represent the minor or his parents or guardian in any other esae
in which it feels that such an appointment is desirable.9 4
The hearing is not open to the public, and the court may "admit
only those persons who, in the discretion of the court, have a direct
interest in the case or in the work of the court."9 The right of a
minor and his parent or guardian to be present at the hearing is
recognized in a qualified fashion:
In a delinquency proceeding, after the child is found to be delinquent, the
court may excuse the presence of the child from the hearing when it is in
the best interests of the child to do so. n any proceeding the court may
temporarily excuse the presence of the parent or guardian of a minor from
the hearing when it is in the best interests of the minor to do so. The
attorney or guardian ad litem, if any, has the right to continue to participate
in proceedings during the absence of the minor, parent, or guardian. 98
report or recommendation made by the county welfare board, probation officer, or
licensed child placing agency or any other information deemed material by the
court." Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 27(2).
91. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22.
92. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(1).
93. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
94. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(2). See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MnqN. L. REv. 547, 568 (1957); Rappeport, Determination of Delin-
quency in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach, 1958 WAS. U.L.Q. 123, 153,
in which the author states:
It is submitted that the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the federal and
various state constitutions, is not only applicable to the juvenile court, but that
the court is obliged to implement this basic guarantee by advising the juvenile
of his right to counsel, and appointing counsel for him where he has none of
his own.
The act further protects the interests of the child by authorizing the appointment
of a guardian ad liters in appropriate cases. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(4).
95. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(1).
96. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(5). Subdivision 3 of the same section provides
that "the county attorney shall present the evidence upon request of the court."
The advisory committee observed:
Sol Rubin, counsel to the N.P.P.A. criticizes the present provision as bringing
in the atmosphere of a prosecution, or at least an aversary aspect which should
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The right of the child to be present at the hearing during considera-
tion of the question whether he has been delinquent is thus indirect-
ly recognized. He may be excluded only after a finding of delin-
quency, while the court considers what disposition should be made.
The reasons for the provision are stated by the advisory committee
as follows:
It is intended that the provision stating that the minor may be tempo-
rarily excused from a delinquency hearing after delinquency is determined
will give the minor the right to be in court and confront witnesses, yet will
authorize the court to excuse him temporarily during the disposition stage
to talk to his parents or others about matters which might undermine the
minor's confidence in his parents. When it is in the best interests of the
minor to do so, the court may also temporarily excuse the parents from
the hearing.97
However, the right to exclude the parent under the above pro-
visions may be open to some question. They appear to authorize the
court to exclude the parent temporarily during the reception of
evidence on the question of whether the child has been delinquent.
However, since the right of the parent to retain custody of his child
is involved, due process may require that the parent have an oppor-
tunity to hear this evidence in order to meet it effectively. This would
be especially true when the parent is not represented by counsel.
Finally, the act provides: "The minor and his parent, guardian, or
custodian are entitled to be heard, to present evidence material to
the case, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing." 98
Speaking about this provision, the advisory committee observed:
"The proposal is intended to outline the basic rights of the indi-
viduals involved in the hearing without codifying the rules of
evidence, many of which are inappropriate to the setting and un-
necessary in a case tried before a judge rather than a jury." 99
E. Rules of Evidence
(1) In General
The comment of the advisory committee last quoted shows that
the intent was to leave to the courts the development of the prin-
ciples of evidence which are to prevail in juvenile court proceedings.
Some of these principles will now be considered in the light of the
be avoided. However, there are situations where facts must be established and
the court or its staff should not be required to be both judge and advocate.
REPORT oF TmE MnqN. LEG. INTERI CovaMN ON PUB. WELFAnE LAws 41 (1959).
97. Id. at 42. The word "excuse" in the last sentence of the quoted statement is
not an apt choice, since it implies a request for permission to leave. Exclusion by
the court regardless of request is undoubtedly intended.
98. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 22(6).
99. REPORT oF =rx Mmm LEG. INTEm COMm'N ON Pui. WELFARE LAws 43
(1959). For a fuller discussion, see Paulsen, supra note 94; Rappeport, supra note
94, Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1128 (1955).
[Vol. 44:363394
DELINQUENCY AND CRIME
judicial decisions which have heretofore considered the subject.
While there has been a tendency to resolve these problems by classi-
fying the proceedings as either civil or criminal, an analysis of the
decisions confirms the belief that, by and large, the principles that
have been worked out have been essentially in terms of the special
needs of this type of proceeding. 100
The admissibility of confessions made by the child has received
little consideration by the courts. The prohibition against admitting
such evidence probably does not apply to the extent to which it has
been recognized in criminal cases. Thus, it has been held that the
requirement of independent proof of the corpus delicti before a
voluntary confession can be considered is inapplicable to a juvenile
court proceeding.1 1 However, where there is reason to believe that
the confession offered in evidence was obtained by police threats or
other third-degree methods, it should be rejected out of hand. Not
only is a confession obtained from a youth by these methods parti-
cularly unreliable as evidence of what is actually confessed, but it is
especially reprehensible that youths, whatever their misdeeds, should
be exposed to these illegal police practices. Consider, for example,
the testimony of a policeman who appeared in a New York case:
Q. Did you make any threats to him?
A. I think I possibly did, I said, "You ought to get a good licking right
here," and one time he didn't answer me just right and I said, "I would
like to punch you in the nose myself" but I didn't mean anything like
that.
Q. You threatened to punch him in the nose unless he told you about
the burglary?
A. I said that, yes.
Q. He became frightened and started to cry?
A. Yes.
Q. After that he told you about being connected with the burglaries?
A. Yes.
The court observed:
It seems rather queer that the protection which is given to adults
• * excluding from evidence their confessions produced by threats,
should be withdrawn from young children more easily frightened than
adults, and that such confessions should be considered of any weight.' 0 2
The sound approach is suggested by the District of Columbia Muni-
cipal Court of Appeals in Matter of McDonald: "Where the evidence
of the Government consists largely of the statements of the minor,
100. See text commencing at note 67 supra.
101. In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954).
102. People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 311-12, 155 N.E. 584, 586 (1927).
The proceeding before the court was regarded as a criminal one, but it is still
significant for juvenile court proceedings. In Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d
458 (5th Cir. 1958), the point was raised but found to be factually without merit.
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the court is duty bound to thoroughly investigate the circumstances
under which the statements were made." 0 3
The constitutional privilege not to testify against one's self applies
to juvenile court proceedings. 04 But the privilege probably extends
no farther than to the refusal to testify. It does not include the right
to have the court forewarn the child or others appearing for him
that he has a right not to incriminate himself.'0 5 Compelling a child
to testify carries a three-fold implication. First, the juvenile court
judge might use the testimony in adjudging the child a delinquent.
However, since this is concededly not a criminal proceeding, this
aspect of the objection has little content. Second, the possibility
exists that at the end of the hearing, the judge may decide to refer
the case to a criminal court for prosecution for a criminal offense.
To compel testimony which might lead to this result could fall
within the constitutional prohibition. The point is not met by the
provision of the act'06 that "any evidence given by the child in the
juvenile court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child
in any case or proceeding in any other court," for the prosecution
might be pursued as a result of the disclosure without the use of the
evidence given. Third, the case may be one in which the compelled
testimony might disclose the commission of some other crime unre-
lated to the charge being made and which might expose the child to
a new juvenile court proceeding with possible transfer to a criminal
court.
The extent to which a child can voluntarily waive the privilege
against self-incrimination and the extent to which a juvenile court
is foreclosed from referring a case for criminal prosecution, once the
child is compelled to testify, are questions on which the judicial
decisions appear to be silent. It would seem that to compel, 07 or
even invite, a child to make disclosure and then to refer the case for
criminal prosecution would fall within the purview of the consti-
tutional privilege.
The juvenile court will undoubtedly be required to recognize and
apply the privileges against testifying resulting from such relation-
ships as attorney-client, husband-wife, and physician-patient."' 8
103. 153 A.2d 651, 657--58 (1959).
104. In re Tahbel, 46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
105. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932).
106. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 31.
107. In Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 605, 109 A.2d 523, 525-26 (1954), the
court stated that the child had not been compelled to testify: "He was questioned in
the same manner and in the same spirit as a parent might have acted .... " In an-
swer to the point that the case might be transferred to another court for criminal
prosecution, the court observed: "But such a certification could not be made after
the Juvenile Court had made an adjudication of delinquency nor, perhaps, after any
self-incriminatory examination of the child." Id. at 605, 109 A.2d at 526.
108. In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
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These privileges arise from considerations of policy quite unaffected
by the nature of the proceedings in which they are invoked.
(2) Hearsay
The question whether hearsay testimony may be introduced and
considered has led to considerable confusion and some conflict.
There is a disposition to interpret the cases as either permitting or
not permitting its use, but an examination of the cases will indicate
that the issue is seldom presented in this simple form. Typically,
either the discussion was not necessary to the decision of the case,
or there were other factors present besides the reception of hearsay
evidence which account for the disposition of the case.
The case most often quoted is People v. Lewis,0 9 in which the
court said:
When it is said that even in cases of lawbreaking delinquency constitutional
safeguards and the technical procedure of the criminal law may be dis-
regarded, there is no implication that a purely socialized trial of a specific
issue may properly or legally be had. The contrary is true.... The cus-
tomary rules of evidence shown by long experience as essential to getting
at the truth with reasonable certainty in civil trials must be adhered to.
The finding of fact must rest on a preponderance of evidence adduced
under those rules. Hearsay, opinion, gossip, bias, prejudice, trends of hostile
neighborhood feeling, the hopes and fears of social workers, are all sources
of error and have no more place in Children's Courts than in any other
court.1 0
The statement on its face indicates that it was not the product of
careful analysis, and the facts of the case provided no necessity for
such analysis. The objection that had been raised to the proceeding
was not the specific one that evidence had been improperly received,
but the broad one that the requirements of proof which prevail in a
criminal trial should have been applied. The appellate court rejected
this contention and sustained the action of the Children's Court. To
show that "the rights of the child and of the parents are thus amply
safeguarded," the above statement was added. That the sweeping
condemnation of hearsay, opinion, etc., was not intended as a defini-
tive statement is evidenced by the fact that no recognition was given
even to the obviously existing exceptions to the hearsay and opinion
rules.
In In re Contreras,"' the youth before the juvenile court was
charged with participation in a gang fight which resulted in serious
injury to another youth. He denied the charge. His participation was
sought to be established by the testimony of another participant, one
Gill. At the hearing, however, Gill denied that Contreras had been
109. 260 N.Y. 171, 178, 183 N.E. 353, 355 (1932).
110. Id. at 178, 183 N.E. at 355.
111. 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
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involved in the fight, a denial in which he persisted notwithstand-
ing the judge's assurance that "we are not going to tell the rest of the
boys that you told us anything."" A law-enforcement officer testi-
fied that, prior to the hearing, Gill had told him that Contreras had
been involved in the fight. It was held that this evidence, without
more, was not sufficient to permit the finding of delinquency to
stand. The court said:
Surely, a minor charged in the juvenile court with acts denounced by law
as a felony does not have lesser constitutional or statutory rights or guaran-
tees than are afforded an adult under similar circumstances in the superior
court. The record herein is barren of sufficient legal evidence to establish
even reasonable or probable cause of the minor's guilt, and he should have
been returned to his family, an institution that has ever been recognized
as the foundation of society, and the sanctity of which the law has always
upheld. A charge against a minor resulting in his removal from the custody
of his parents cannot be regarded lightly, and such action is not justified
unless facts be shown by evidence, the verity of which has been carefully
and legally tested."13
There was but the barest mention of the hearsay rule. It seems evi-
dent that the issues presented in the case went much deeper than
that rule. The case would appear to involve the basic question as to
the degree of proof required to sustain a finding as serious as that of
delinquency which may, and in this case did, result in a commitment
to an institution. Moreover, there were overtones of hostility toward
the child at the hearing which probably prejudiced his case, and he
was not represented by counsel. Under these circumstances, the
appellate court quite properly refused to permit the finding to stand,
when it was based on nothing more than the hearsay statement
reported by the law-enforcement officer and contradicted by the
declarant under oath. But this case certainly is not authority for the
proposition that no hearsay statements are admissible in juvenile
court proceedings.
A somewhat similar situation was presented to the appellate court
in In the Matter of Greene, in which the court considered the
sufficiency of a petition in a collateral attack on an adjudication of
delinquency. The petition alleged the following:
The proceedings were conducted solely by the judge who based his de-
cision to send the appellant to the "Boys School and straighten him up" on
hearsay information contained in an ex parte report furnished by his proba-
tion officer. That such report was not produced in evidence and the
appellant was not advised of its contents nor afforded any opportunity to
defend himself against any derogatory matter therein contained. That the
entire proceedings were conducted in his absence and he was deprived
of his liberty without being confronted by a single witness and without
benefit of cross-examining those who had furnished information contained
112. Id. at 789, 241 P.2d at 632.
113. Id. at 790, 241 P.2d at 633.
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in such ex parte report or denying such accusations by his own testi-
mony.114
This was rightly characterized as a "star chamber proceeding where-
by a boy was torn from the custody of his parents and deprived of
his liberty without a semblance of due process and by reason of a
judgment that was not merely erroneous but absolutely void." 115
That the issues involved went far beyond the admissibility of hearsay
evidence is self-evident.
A series of Nebraska decisions have insisted more emphatically on
the exclusion of hearsay evidence, and yet, close examination of
these decisions reveals that the position of this court is not clear and
its reasoning is not satisfactory. The first of these, Krell v. Mantell,116
appears not to distinguish between unsworn testimony given in court
and hearsay statements made outside of the hearing and offered in
evidence; the court's condemnation evidently encompasses both."1
The opinion of the court evidenced a hostility to the informality of
hearings in juvenile courts - an attitude which hds persisted in later
cases."" Thus, in State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Barkus 19 unsworn state-
114. 123 Ind. App. 81, 85-86, 108 N.E.2d 647, 649 (1952).
115. Id. at 86, 108 N.E.2d at 649.
116. 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954).
117. The attorney for the child made the following incomprehensible objection:
Then my first objection to the statement of Mr. Krell at this time is based upon
these grounds: First, that it is unswom and consequently it is a relation of what
is classified as hearsay testimony and in the nature of an admission against in-
terest of any parties in this lawsuit.
The court's opinion continued:
Mr. Krell then proceeded to make a detailed statement with regard to the de-
fendant not under oath all of which was clearly and admittedly hearsay. Others
were allowed to make statements not under oath and which likewise were
hearsay.
The court posed this question:
Can it be that it [the legislature] intended that trial should be had without the
benefit of testimony of witnesses given under the sanction of oath or afflimation?
Id. at 906, 62 N.W.2d at 311. A decision that witnesses should testify under oath
does not require that all hearsay evidence must be excluded.
The opinion of the court consists largely of quotations from People v. Lewis, 260
N.Y. 171p 183 N.E. 353 (1932), and In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 247 Pac. 591 (1926).
However, the latter case involved dependency rather than delinquency, and the opin-
ion was primarily concerned with undisclosed information given to the judge rather
than with hearsay.
118. In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151 (1954), presented a de-
pendency case in which the juvenile court judge refused to require witnesses to tes-
tify under oath and denied counsel the right to cross-examine witnesses, on the
ground that "this was only a clinical proceeding . . . and that the rules of evidence
were not applicable." Id. at 250, 63 N.W.2d at 155.
The adjudication was reversed, the appellate court saying:
If there is a contested issue of fact to be tried and determined in a proceeding
by virtue of the statute concerning juvenile dependents or delinquents, as there
is in this case, the result of an investigation ex parte and clinical in its nature
may not be used as legal evidence in the trial of the contest, except insofar as
it satisfies the requirements of the rules of evidence. It is sometimes said in de-
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ments of three witnesses were taken prior to the hearing in the form
of questions put by the deputy county attorney and the answers of
the witnesses thereto. These statements were held to be "nothing
more than reports of an ex parte investigation and inadmissible."120
But there were other objectionable features of the case which played
a major part in bringing about a reversal of the juvenile court's
decision. The boy and his widowed mother were not represented by
counsel; proper notice required by statute appears not to have been
given the mother; neither the boy nor his mother were advised "as
to their legal rights or the consequences which could flow from the
proceeding"; 121 and the boy "was called by the deputy county
attorney as the first witness to testify against himself." 2 2 As these
factors played a major role in the decision, the case cannot be re-
garded as holding that the admission of hearsay testimony is, in
itself, a ground for reversal.
In its latest pertinent decision, Krell v. Sanders, 23 the Nebraska
court has stated in strong terms the necessity of observing the rules
of evidence and procedure of a civil action. The youth was charged
with having been involved in an assault; this he and others denied
at the hearing. But an assistant probation officer testified that the
youth had told him otherwise before the hearing. The appellate
court found that this was the only testimony supporting the charge
and held that it could not be used. In so doing, the court said:
It has been previously said and is now affirmed that in a hearing before
the Juvenile Court the customary rules of evidence must be adhered to and
a finding of fact may not rest on or be sustained by hearsay or unsworn
statements; that the essential processes, rules, and procedures of the law
established and observed to guide and aid courts in the trial and decision
of issues of fact are applicable to proceedings under the Juvenile Court
Act and they are not permitted to be disregarded because the act refers to
such a proceeding as a summary one; and that an issue of fact in such a
proceeding must be heard and determined by observance of the rules of
evidence that are considered essential and appropriate to ascertain the
truth and to protect substantial rights in hearings had without a jury for
the adjudication of issues of fact of civil cases in the district court.124
linquency cases involving very serious juvenile misconduct that constitutional
safeguards and the procedures of the criminal law may be disregarded, but even
in this there is no implication that a purely informal, hasty trial of a contested
issue of fact may properly or legally be had with only scant regard to rules of
evidence or of procedure.
Id. at 252, 63 N.W.2d at 155-56.
119. 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959).
120. Id. at -, 95 N.W.2d at 677. Both Krell v. Mantell, 157 Neb. 900, 62 N.W.2d
308 (1954) and In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 63 N.W.2d 151 (1954) were relied
upon.
121. State ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Barkus, supra note 120 at -, 95 N.W.2d at 677.
122. Ibid.
123. 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959).
124. Id. at -, 96 N.W.2d at 221-22.
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The court concluded that "the hearsay, incompetent, and irrelevant
testimony of the assistant probation officer must be and is disre-
garded in the consideration and decision of this appeal." 125 A
striking fact about the case is that the court makes no mention of
what would appear to be the controlling principle governing the
case and leading to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the state-
ment of the boy to which the probation officer testified seems clearly
to have constituted an admission or even a voluntary confession and
hence would have been admissible in both civil and criminal cases
as an exception to the hearsay rule.126 The explanation probably lies
in the fact that the appellate court was convinced of the boy's inno-
cence 127 and would not permit a hearsay statement, even if admis-
sible as an-admission, to sustain a contrary finding. Had the decision
been based on this ground, it would have been consistent with the
import of the decisions in the cases under consideration.
While one may conclude, therefore, that the Nebraska decisions
do not necessarily foreclose the reception of hearsay evidence in
juvenile court cases, certainly the language employed by that court
leans strongly toward that result. The attitude of the court may
explain, in considerable part, the relatively numeros appeals from
juvenile court decisions in that state.
The significant contribution of the cases so far considered would
appear to be that appellate courts will not sustain an adjudication of
delinquency which is based on flimsy and unreliable evidence, espe-
cially when the charge of delinquency is based on criminal conduct.
If the adjudication is founded on nothing more than hearsay state-
ments, not falling within the recognized exceptions, and especially
where the declarants have denied making the statements or where
the hearsay consists of gossip, rumor, or suspicion, appellate courts
generally will not permit the adjudication to stand.
Consistent with these principles are those decisions which hold
that if reliable evidence has established a substantial case showing
the delinquent conduct of the child, the fact that hearsay evidence
has also been received will not be a ground for reversal. The unfairly
maligned case of Holmes' Appeal 28 holds in accordance with this
statement. In that case a convicted criminal, in his confession, impli-
cated the youth who was brought into juvenile court. The appellate
court sustained admission into evidence of the confession, notwith-
125. Id. at -, 96 N.W.2d at 222.
126. he weight of evidence of an admission is for the jury. An admission may
be made in such language and under such circumstances as to make it the most sat-
isfactory kind of proof." Linderoth v. Kieffer, 162 Minn. 440, 444, 203 N.W. 415,
417 (1925). Accord, Litman v. Peper, 214 Minn. 127, 129, 7 N.W.2d 334, 335
(1943). See also McComiimcu, EvmiaNcE § 239 (1954).
127. See the quotation from the case cited note 47 supra.
128. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
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standing the repudiation of the validity of the confession by the man
who made it. The court said:
It is true that subsequently the man who had made the confession repudi-
ated it and now stated that appellant did not participate in the robbery,
but of course the judge was not obliged to believe his retraction. He
admitted that he had made the confession and the fact that the testimony
of the detective was technically "hearsay" was therefore wholly unimpor-
tant. Moreover, from the very nature of the hearings in the Juvenile Court
it cannot be required that strict rules of evidence should be applied as
they properly would be in the trial of cases in the criminal court. Although,
of course, a finding of delinquency must be based on sufficient competent
evidence, the hearing in the Juvenile Court may, in order to accomplish
the purposes for which juvenile court legislation is designed, avoid many
of the legalistic features of the rules of evidence customarily applicable to
other judicial hearings. Even from a purely technical standpoint hearsay
evidence, if it is admitted without objection and is relevant and material to
the issue, is to be given its natural probative effect and may be received as
direct evidence. . . . Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the judge who .resided in the Juvenile Court acted in the final dis-
position of appellant s case on the basis of any conclusion that appellant
had in fact participated in the armed robbery of the church.129
One cannot read the case without concluding that the juvenile court
had before it a seriously disturbed child with a long history of delin-
quent conduct. To have reversed a finding of delinquency because
of the reception of the hearsay statement would have defeated the
rightful purposes of the juvenile court in the case, while contributing
nothing to the rights or interests of the child.
In the same vein is the decision in State v. Christensen.30 The
Utah juvenile court statute' 31 under consideration by the court in
that case went further than most juvenile court legislation in remov-
ing the formalities associated with customary litigation. One of its
provisions permitted the court to "receive in evidence the verified
reports of probation officers, physicians, psychologists, psychia-
trists. .... , 132 In the case before the court, two letters were re-
ceived in evidence. One, which was verified, came from a school
superintendent and gave the results of an achievement test taken
129. Id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.130. 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760 (1951).
131. UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-7-25 (1943), quoted in part by the court as follows:
In all cases relating to the delinquency, neglect, dependency or other cases of
children and their disposition the court shall be regarded as exercising equity
jurisdiction. The court may conduct the hearing in an informal manner and
may adopt any form of procedure in such cases which it deems best suited to
ascertain the facts relating to such cases and to make a disposition in the best
interests of such children and of the public.... The court may hear evidence
in the absence of such children, and may compel children to testify concerning
the facts alleged in the petition.
119 Utah at 364, 227 P.2d at 761.
132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-7-25 (1943), quoted by the court in the Christensen
case. 119 Utah at 365, 227 P.2d at 762.
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by the youth; the other, unverified, came from a physician and gave
the results of physical and psychological tests. Apparently the court
had no difficulty in upholding the admission of both. Both were
clearly hearsay statements. And one did not meet the statutory
requirements of verification, but the court could find no prejudice
to the child by its admission. One may observe that the letters illus-
trate the kind of hearsay which may serve as a reliable source of
information.
Implicit in the hearing contemplated by the new Minnesota
juvenile court code is the production of witnesses who testify to the
essential facts and who may be cross-examined on behalf of the
child, parents, and other interested parties. But it is the conclusion
of this writer, from a review of the decisions on the subject, and
based on the purposes, tenor, and provisions of the new code, that
the reception of hearsay statements, in and of itself without more, is
not error. The fundamental test of the validity of a finding of delin-
quency is: Does it rest on a substantial basis in the evidence, having
regard to the gravity and importance of the issues and consequences
involved?' 33 This may well require something more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. The reception of hearsay evidence
bears only on this basic question. If the finding is so supported, the
fact that hearsay evidence was admitted during the course of the
hearing is not ground for setting the finding aside. 34 For example,
there is little danger of receiving untrustworthy information in ad-
mitting into evidence the report of a physician or psychiatrist con-
cerning the physical or mental condition of the child, or a report
from the child's school concerning his attendance and scholarship
record, or a report from his employer concerning the child's ab-
senteeism. An affidavit from one who cannot attend the hearing,
133. The writer finds this test implicit in the provisions of the act. The extent to
which the test finds support in the constitutional requirements of due process is not
considered here. Compare In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651 (1959), where the District
of Columbia Municipal Court of Appeals stated:
[T]he courts have said that the rights of a minor in the Juvenile Court stem
from three sources: (1) those expressly accorded the individual by the statute
itself; (2) those which are so fundamental as to be implied from the Act; and
(3) those rights within the meaning of due process insofar as that provision is
applicable to civil actions. Specifically, the constitutional safeguards peculiar to
criminal proceedings do not apply.
134. This principle prevails in administrative proceedings, see 2 DAws, Anumas-
TxArvE LAw TAmTws § 14.08 (1958), and arbitration proceedings, see UNronm
Annrrn&ToN AcT § 5(b); MmNN. STAT. § 572.12(b) (1957); 3 Am.. Jun. Arb. &
Award § 108 (1936); 6 C.J.S. Arb. & Avard § 65 (1938).
Section 22, subdivision 6, of the new Juvenile Court Act, Minn. Laws 1959, ch.
685, quoted in the text accompanying note 98 supra, stemmed from these sources.
"The idea is derived from MINN. STAT. § 572.12(b), the UnwoBm ArBTRATioN AcT,
and U.S.C. § 1006, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act." REPORT OF THE
MINN. LEG. INrTmU Co a'N ON PUB. WELPFnE LAws 43 (1959).
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which was made under circumstances that negative any reason for
falsification, also might well be received. The weight to be given
such evidence will, of course, take into account that it has not been
given in court, under oath or subject to cross-examination. If, in a
particular case, the information so obtained should become the sub-
ject of serious dispute at the hearing and bear on an issue critical to
the determination of delinquency, or if the court itself desires more
complete information, the court should continue the case for the
purpose of bringing the declarants into court to testify as witnesses.
If, on the other hand, the adjudication rests on nothing more than
hearsay, and especially if it is of an unreliable nature, such as gossip
and rumor, or hearsay that is repudiated by the declarant, the basic
test will not have been satisfied and the adjudication of delinquency
should not be permitted to stand. These principles are in accordance
with the modem trend in all fields of litigation toward relaxation of
the rigid adherence to the hearsay rule, especially in cases before a
judge rather than a jury.1 5 It should not be overlooked that this
expanded concept of admissible evidence operates not only to make
the proof of delinquency easier. When one considers the economic
status and limited resources available to the average youth before
the juvenile court, and to his family, it also may work to his ad-
vantage rather than to his disadvantage to be able to establish his
innocence by means other than the production of witnesses in court.
F. Disposition
In addition to some general provisions in the act relating to the
principles controlling, and the powers granted in, the disposition of
cases coming before the juvenile court,'36 there is a separate section
dealing specifically with the disposition that may be made in delin-
quency cases. 37 As compared with the previous code, this section
states in clearer terms and, to some extent, broadens the powers of
the judge. The section begins by providing:
If the court finds that the child is delinquent, it shall enter an order
making any of the following dispositions of the case which are deemed
necessary to the rehabilitation of the child: 138
Then follow several alternatives. Subdivision (a) provides:
Counsel the child or his parents, guardian, or custodian.139
The power to consult would appear to reside in the judge without
the necessity of the act's specifically providing for it, but it may be
135. See McCoaMIcx, EVIDENCE §§ 300-05 (1954).
136. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 27.
137. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28.
138. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1).
139. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(a).
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well that it be expressed in order to emphasize that the goal in these
cases is assistance and guidance with a view to rehabilitation rather
than punishment. Any such consultation should be engaged in by
the judge only with a clear conception of what it will accomplish by
way of rehabilitation and how it will interrelate with other measures
being taken. Unless the judge has gained the confidence of the child
and his parents, his counseling may be of limited effectiveness and,
if it descends to the level of lecturing or moralizing, it may do more
harm than good.
Subdivision (b) provides:
Place the child under the supervision of a probation officer or other
suitable person in his own home under conditions prescribed by the court
including reasonable rules for his conduct and the conduct of his parents,
guardian, or custodian designed for the physical, mental, and moral well-
being and behavior of the child.140
The reason for including the phrase "other suitable person" was
stated by the advisory committee to be that "the juvenile judges feel
this provision is essential in counties where probation service is un-
available or limited." 14 With the adoption of the probation service
act already discussed, 14 2 this reason no longer has much force. How-
ever, it may still serve a useful purpose in those cases where the
skilled services of a probation officer are not needed and where
rehabilitation of the child can be effected under the direction of a
private citizen of the community who is carefully selected for the
purpose. The provision does not contemplate that this person need
reside in the home.
Subdivision (c) provides:
Subject to the supervision of the court, transfer the legal custody of the
child to one of the following:
(1) A child-placing agency; or
(2) The county welfare board; or
(8) A reputable individual of good moral character; or
(4) A county home school, if the county maintains a home school or
enters into an agreement with a county home school. 143
An order under this clause must fix the length of time for which the
period of legal custody is to run, but this order can be renewed from
time to time or, after notice and hearing, a new disposition made. 44
Subdivision (d) provides:
Transfer legal custody by commitment to the youth conservation com-
mission.145
140. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(b).
141. REsoaT oF MmN. LEO. INTRnm CommN oN PuB. WErF~uA LAws 55 (1959).
142. See text commencing at note 80 supra.
148. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(c).
144. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(4).
145. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(d).
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If such an order is made, the court loses jurisdiction to make any
further disposition of the child. What disposition is thereafter to be
made is determined by the youth conservation commission.'46
Subdivision (e) provides:
If the child is found to have violated a state or local law or ordinance
which has resulted in damage to the property of another, the court may
order the child to make reasonable restitution for such damage.147
Cases often arise in juvenile courts in which the necessity on the
part of the youth of having to pay for the damage or destruction he
has caused will have a wholesome rehabilitative effect. But the
power to require restitution must be exercised with great caution by
the juvenile court judge lest the processes of the court be subverted
into a device for collecting private claims. A dispute over the value
of the property damaged or destroyed would engage the court in an
issue having only a remote relation to the court's primary function
of determining what is the best disposition to be made with respect
to the child.
The remaining powers need not be quoted. The court may order
medical care for the child, either at the expense of the parents, if
they are able to pay for it, or at the expense of the welfare funds of
the county. 48 If the child has committed a felony, the court may also
recommend to the commissioner of highways the cancellation of the
child's driver's license until the child's eighteenth birthday, if "it is
in the best interests of the child and of public safety" to do so.'"
This provision originated from a recommendation made by the Com-
mission on Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, and Corrections,
which said in support of it:
The chronically or seriously delinquent youngster is almost sure to be an
irresponsible and dangerous driver. Several law enforcement officers identi-
fied the delinquent youngsters as their most serious traffic problem. As a
result much sympathy was expressed with Judge Tallakson's desire to
restrict the driving of some persons under 18 who have been adjudged
delinquent, regardless of whether or not their delinquencies involved the
use of an automobile.'" 0
The provision should be administered in keeping with the policy so
expressed.
The act also provides that, except when the child has been com-
mitted to the youth conservation commission, "the court may, within
146. For a statement of the powers of the youth conservation commission, see
MmN. STAT., ch. 242, (1957) particularly §§ 242.10, .19.
147. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(e).
148. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(f).
149. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(1)(g).
150. See REP ORT OF THE CONMISSION ON JUvENILE DELINQUENcY, ADULT CRMM,
"D CORRECTIONS; SAmER DmvING BY JUVENILES IN MINNESOTA 76 (1959).
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90 days, expunge the adjudication of delinquency." 151 Presumably,
the ninety days begins to run from the date of the order adjudicating
the delinquency, rather than from the order of discharge. If such is
the proper construction, its justification must lie in the belief that if
the child requires a longer period of treatment than ninety days, the
adjudication of delinquency should not be "expunged." What the
procedure is that "expunges" the adjudication is not clear. The term
has no accepted meaning. It can hardly mean the destruction of the
document containing the adjudication. It would appear to anticipate
a new order cancelling or revoking the one previously made.
G. Transfer to Another Court
The new code provides:
Subdivision 1. When a child is alleged to have violated a state or local
law or ordinance after becoming 14 years of age the juvenile court may
enter an order referring the alleged violation to the appropriate prosecuting
authority for action under laws in force governing the commission of and
punishment for violations of statutes or local laws or ordinances. The order
of reference terminates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in the matter.
Subdivision 2. The juvenile court may order a reference only if
(a) A petition has been filed in accordance with the provisions of
section 17,
(b) Notice has been given in accordance with the provisions of sections
18 and 19,
(c) A hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of section
22, and
(d) The court finds that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the
public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to
juvenile courts.
Subdivision 3. When the juvenile court enters an order referring an
alleged violation to a prosecuting authority, the prosecuting authority shall
proceed with the case as if the jurisdiction of the juvenile court had never
attached. 5 2
These provisions indicate that the transfer of a case by the juvenile
court to another court is intended to be something more than a per-
functory affair. The requirements with respect to the petition, notice
to interested parties, and hearing must be substantially observed,
and the rights afforded a child and other parties at a hearing preced-
ing a finding of delinquency must likewise be accorded them before
the transfer. Evidence must be taken and findings based thereon
must be made. 53
151. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 28(2).
152. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 16.
153. See Wilson v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 10, 22-28, 82 P.2d 308, 314 (1938),
stating:
We think the rule announced in the cases cited, when properly read, hold that
under the provisions of the act creating the Juvenile courts that it is necessary
for this court to pass upon the question of defendant's probable guilt, the na-
ture and disposition of the crime committed, the character of the defendant,
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Because the decision whether a transfer should be made is of such
importance, the Minnesota Supreme Court has insisted upon sub-
stantial adherence to the procedural conditions of transfer. In State
ex rel. Knutson v. Jackson,154 the juvenile court had ordered the
transfer to the district court of a juvenile charged with the killing of
his father, but prior notice of the proceeding had not been given to
the mother. The ensuing sentence of the district court to life im-
prisonment on a plea of guilty was held void, and a writ of habeas
corpus was granted releasing the youth from imprisonment. The
court stated: "We do not see how the clear purpose of the act may
be achieved if it is not mandatory that the proceeding set forth in
c. 260 [the former juvenile court code] take place before a delin-
quent child may be prosecuted in the district court." 1"5
The question whether a transfer should be made will ordinarily
arise only in cases where the child has committed a felony and evi-
dences such deep seated criminal tendencies that state, as well as
local, facilities are inadequate to remedy the condition. Since such
transfer may result in the youth conservation commission's receiving
the child by way of criminal conviction rather than on a commitment
for delinquency,""" it would seem desirable that the juvenile court
judges and the commission should adopt a common policy concern-
ing the kind of cases in which transfers should be made. 57
A problem of some perplexity concerns the youth who has com-
mitted an offense while under the juvenile court age, but who is not
apprehended or prosecuted until after he has passed that age. In the
absence of specific statutory provisions to the contrary, courts have
tended to hold that the youth may be prosecuted for the criminal
offense without prior submission of the case to the juvenile court.158
and any other matter which he considers necessary, and to pass upon these ques-
tions at a preliminary investigation, and after this investigation is completed, to
certify his findings to the district court, before the district court shall have juris-
diction to try defendant, where the issue has been raised as to his age, as was
done in this case.
See also Wade v. Warden of State Prison, 145 Me. 120, 73 A.2d 128 (1950); In re
Smith, 326 P.2d 835 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
154. 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
155. Id. at 249, 82 N.W.2d at 237. Accord, State ex rel. Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn.
418, 90 N.W.2d 219 (1958).
156. The district court ...shall commit to the commission every person con-
victed of a felony or gross misdemeanor, who is found to be less than 21 years
of age at the time of his apprehension and who is not sentenced to imprison-
ment for life, or in a county jail for 90 days or less, or to a fine only ....
MnN. STAT. § 242.13 (1957).
157. Where murder is charged, a transfer subjects the child, on conviction, to a
sentence of life imprisonment in a penal institution, rather than to the youth con-
servation commission. If the case is retained by the juvenile court, detention either
locally, or by the youth conservation commission, cannot extend beyond the youth's
twenty-first birthday. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 27(4); Mnzr. STAT. § 242.26
(1957).
158. Burrows v. State, 38 Ariz. 99, 297 Pac. 1029 (1931); People v. Ross, 235 Mich.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated its approval of this
view.'-" This view, of course, permits law-enforcement officers who
desire to circumvent the juvenile court to wait until after the youth
has passed the juvenile court age and then prosecute for the criminal
offense. Two provisions in the new code are designed to avoid this
result. One is section 32, subdivision 1:
A violation of a state or local law or ordinance by a child before becom-
ing 18 years of age is not a crime unless the juvenile court refers the matter
to the appropriate prosecuting authority in accordance with the provisions
of section 16 or to a court in accordance with the provisions of section 80.
The other provision is section 13, subdivision 1:
Except as provided in section 16, the juvenile court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child who is alleged to
be delinquent, a juvenile traffic offender . . . and in proceedings concern-
ing any minor alleged to have been delinquent prior to having become
eighteen years of age. .... 160
Under these provisions, an act constituting a crime committed by a
youth while under the age of eighteen remains within the jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court until he reaches the age of twenty-one and
cannot be made the subject of a criminal proceeding except upon
transfer by the juvenile court.
Where criminal prosecution is deferred until after the youth is
twenty-one and the criminal act charged occurred before he had
reached eighteen, the statute of limitations will stand as a bar in
most cases. The principal exceptions are cases of murder and cases
in which the youth has fled the state during the intervening
period.16' Should such cases arise, it is questionable whether courts
488, 209 N.W. 663 (1926); Scopillitti v. State, 41 Ohio App. 221, 180 N.E. 740
(1932); Ex parte Lewis, 85 Okla. Grim. 322, 188 P.2d 367 (1947), overruling prior
cases to the contrary; Johnson v. State, 321 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1958).
159. See State ex tel. Pett v. Jackson, 252 Minn. 418, 422, 90 N.W.2d 219, 222
(1958), stating:
Respondent, of course, is no longer a juvenile and any original jurisdiction po-
sessed by the juvenile court of Carver County terminated when he ceased to
have such status .... Under the statutes and authorities cited, it follows that re-
spondent is now unlawfully imprisoned and should be discharged from appel-
lant's custody to Carver County officials for trial for the crime for which he was
indicted.
See also State ex tel. Knutson v. Jackson, 249 Minn. 246, 82 N.W.2d 234 (1957).
160. A minor is defined as "an individual under 21 years of age." Minn. Laws
1959, ch. 685, § 2(9). A child is "an individual under 18 years of age and includes
any minor alleged to have been delinquent prior to having become 18 years of age."
Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 685, § 2(2).
161. Indictments for murder may be found at any time after the death of the
person killed; in all other cases, indictments shall be found and filed in the
proper court within three years after the commission of the offense; but the
time during which the defendant shall not be an inhabitant of, or usually resi-
dent within, this state, shall not constitute any part of the limitation of three
years.
Mnn~. STAT. § 628.26 (1957). While § 32 of the new code (Minn. Laws 1959, ell.
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will accept the contention that criminal prosecution must have the
referral of the juvenile court, that the juvenile court has lost juris-
diction, and that prosecution, therefore, is impossible.162 Section 32,
subdivision 1, may properly be read as requiring juvenile court
referral prior to criminal prosecution regardless of the then age of
the defendant, if the act was committed prior to the youth's attain-
ing the age of eighteen. Being so required, the court has jurisdiction
to order it. Wise precaution dictates that this course be followed and
an order of referral obtained.163 Conflicting conceptions of responsi-
bility are involved in these cases. A youth is not held responsible for
his acts in the criminal law sense but, instead, is subjected to treat-
ment and rehabilitation. By what transformation does he become
responsible and liable to criminal punishment for that same act,
which he committed in his youth, as he grows into manhood?
685, § 82) states that the act is not a crime unless the juvenile court refers the case,
the purpose is to bar criminal prosecution without such reference rather than to con-
dition the existence of the substantive crime thereon. Constitutional problems would
arise under any other interpretation.
162. Note the reaction of the majority of the court to this possibility in People v.
Ross, 235 Mich. 433, 442-43, 209 N.W. 663, 666 (1926):
Suppose a youth, one day under 15 years of age, lies in wait, deliberately shoots
and kills a neighbor, robs and hides his body, conceals the weapon, and is not
discovered as the murderer until he is one day past the age of 17 years, then,
if my Brother is right, the offender is beyond the reach of the law, for his age
at the date of the crime, fixes exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court, and
that court has no jurisdiction over one arrested after reaching the age of 17
years, and he cannot be charged with a felony in the circuit court, for, at the
date of the murder, he was not 15 years of age. There is no limitation of time
within which one committing a murder must be charged therewith, and con-
struction of this statute which would bar prosecution of a murderer, if a youth
a few days under 15 years of age when he committed the crime, and avoids dis-
covery until he is above the age of 17 years of age, cannot have my sanction.
163. A similar suggestion was not regarded with much favor in Scopillitti v. State,
41 Ohio App. 221, 180 N.E. 740 (1932). But in Wilson v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 10,
82 P.2d 308 (1938), the court did not hesitate to require juvenile court action in
a murder case, even though the youth was then over the juvenile court age. The
point was not discussed and the case was later overruled in Ex parte Lewis, 85
Okla. Crim. 322, 356, 188 P.2d 367, 387 (1947).
